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Despite international and domestic policies and programs intended to combat human 
trafficking, Colombia remains one of the countries with the highest instances of human 
trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Factors contributing to human trafficking in 
Colombia, such as internal violence and displacement, drug trafficking, a weak central 
government, and widespread corruption, have overpowered what energies the 
government marshaled against it. Moreover, governmental anti-trafficking programs tend 
to be underfunded, poorly administered, and quickly abandoned by Colombian officials. 
Additionally, hardline U.S. anti-drug policies in the region have aggravated the human 
trafficking problem without significantly affecting the flow of illegal drugs into the 
United States. Consequently, thwarting human trafficking, protecting and providing for 
its victims, and prosecuting perpetrators of the crime have been significantly challenging 
in this South American country. 
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I. THESIS INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
As a source country for what some researchers believe to be around 70,000 annual 
victims—primarily for sex and forced labor—Colombia consistently ranks as one of the 
countries with the highest instances of human trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.1 
Yet, Colombia has signed and ratified all five relevant international protocols on human 
trafficking, and the United States has certified it as a top-tier country in the fight against 
human trafficking for thirteen consecutive years (from 2001 to 2013).2 This Tier 1 rating 
signified the Colombian government fully complied with the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking as established by the United States’ Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA).3 Only in 2014 did the government’s ranking 
drop to a Tier 2, which, by definition, indicates that not all minimum standards were met, 
but that the country is making significant efforts to do so.4 
With the TVPA, the United States set standards for action and attached monetary 
and social incentives to compliance.5 According to the TVPA, “the President is 
authorized to provide assistance to foreign countries directly, or through 
nongovernmental and multilateral organizations, for programs, projects, and activities 
designed to meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.”6 Conversely, 
1 Miriam Wells, “UN Warns of Rise in Human Trafficking within Colombia,” InSightCrime, 
April 16, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/un-warns-growing-human-trafficking-colombia; 
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
State, 2014), 134, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm; Clare Ribando Seelke, Trafficking in 
Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, (CRS Report No. 33200) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2014), 5–6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33200.pdf; Smriti Rao and Christina 
Presenti, “Understanding Human Trafficking Origin: A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis,” Feminist 
Economics 18, no. 2 (2012): 245, doi:10.1080/13545701.2012.680978; Martti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa, 
“Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” Crime and Justice 34, no. 1 (2006): 199, doi:10.1086/650306. 
2 Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 15; Tier placement data 
compiled from Colombia country profiles in annual TIP reports from 2001 to 2013 at U.S. Department of 
State, “Trafficking in Persons Report,” August 22, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm. 
3 Bureau of Public Affairs Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,” U.S. Department of State, October 28, 2000, 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/61124.htm. 
4 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 43, 134–35. 
5 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. Rep No. 3244 at 1 (2000). 
6 Ibid., 134 
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governments that fail to meet the minimum standards for elimination of human 
trafficking and are not making “significant efforts” to bring themselves into compliance 
will not only suffer the international stigma associated with receiving a lower ranking, 
but are also subject to monetary consequences.7 In such instances, the TVPA directs 
withdrawal of “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance,”8 or, in the case of 
a country that was not receiving such assistance, “the United States will not provide 
funding for participation by officials or employees of such governments in educational 
and cultural exchange programs.”9 And, in either case, 
The President will instruct the United States Executive Director of each 
multilateral development bank and of the International Monetary Fund to 
vote against, and to use the Executive Director’s best efforts to deny, any 
loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution to that 
country (other than for humanitarian assistance, for trade-related 
assistance, or for development assistance which directly addresses basic 
human needs, is not administered by the government of the sanctioned 
country, and confers no benefit to that government).10 
The United States is willing to help, but support is contingent on playing by U.S. rules. 
In addition to the Colombian and U.S. governments, many other entities have 
been committed to reducing human trafficking in Colombia. The United Nations (UN), of 
which Colombia has been a member state since 1945, has established a shared definition 
and expectations in the battle to eliminate human trafficking worldwide, carrying out its 
anti-human trafficking work through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), which has an office in Bogotá, Colombia.11 Colombia is also a member of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is active in the country and 
remains dedicated to “assist States in the development and delivery of programmes, 
7 Ibid. 
 8 Ibid., 103. 
 9 Ibid., 110. 
10 Ibid. 
11 United Nations. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (General 
Assembly Resolution No. 55/25) (New York: UN, 2001), http://www.undocs.org/A/RES/55/25; United 
Nations, “United Nations Member States,” accessed February 17, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Colombia,” 
accessed February 12, 2015, http://www.unodc.org/colombia/es/index.html. 
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studies and technical expertise on combating migrant smuggling and trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children, in a manner consistent with international 
law.”12 These organizations, among others, provide support, guidance, and reporting 
regarding the human trafficking problem in Colombia.13 
In spite of all efforts to suppress it, human trafficking continues to be a sizable 
issue in Colombia: victimization remains high while prosecutions and convictions of 
perpetrators remain low (there were less than thirty verified convictions between 2005 
and 2010).14 The question remains: why? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
Why does Colombia continue to be a major source of human trafficking in the 
Western Hemisphere despite current policies and programs and the intervention of the 
international community? 
Colombia is a key ally with which the United States wishes to continue to partner 
economically and politically, and friction over unabated human rights violations has 
challenged the positive relationship between the two countries.15 U.S. foreign assistance 
to Colombia has averaged nearly $743 million annually over the last five years—funds 
that, according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
were spent in an effort to deepen trade relationships, continue regional economic 
integration, enforce labor laws, dismantle transnational criminal networks, and combat 
12 International Organization for Migration, “Member States,” November 2014, 
http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/members-and-observers/governments/member-
states.html; International Organization for Migration, “Mission,” accessed February 17, 2015, 
http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/mission.html. 
13 Benjy Hansen-Bundy, “Colombia Neglects Sex Trafficking Victims: NGO,” Colombia Reports, 
February 20, 2013, http://colombiareports.co/colombia-neglects-sex-trafficking-victims-ngo/. 
14 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 199; Elvia Vargas Trujillo, Carmen 
Elisa Flórez, and Laura María Mendoza Simonds, Trata de Personas En Colombia: Una Aproximación a 
La Magnitud Y Comprensión Del Problema (Bogotá D.C., Colombia: Organización Internacional para las 
Migraciones, 2011), 46, http://www.oim.org.co/trata-de-personas/1522-trata-de-personas-en-colombia-una-
aproximacion-a-la-magnitud-y-comprension-del-problema.html. 
15 Secretary of State, FY 2014 Department of State Operations Congressional Budget Justification 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2013), 173, 586, 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/statecbj/2014/pdf/index.htm. 
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human rights violations, among other things.16 Many of these efforts are tied to factors 
affecting human trafficking in Colombia. Yet, some individuals and organizations outside 
the government, such as Amnesty International, view the lack of progress in human rights 
in Colombia as reason to cut off U.S. aid to the country and lobby for just that.17 
The Department of State also recognizes that Colombia needs to try harder to 
fight human trafficking. Citing slacking government efforts to combat human trafficking, 
the State Department demoted Colombia’s TVPA ranking in its most recent report—an 
act that can carry negative financial and political implications, as mentioned previously.18 
Moreover, because the demotion was based on subjective factors, there is an inherent 
political aspect to the ranking—a message that the United States is not happy with 
Colombia’s progress. According to the TVPA, the minimum standards for the elimination 
of trafficking against which countries are ranked are as follows: 
1) The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of 
trafficking in persons and punish acts of such trafficking. 2) For the 
knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, 
coercion, or in which the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of 
giving meaningful consent, or of trafficking which includes rape or 
kidnapping or which causes a death, the government of the country should 
prescribe punishment commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as 
forcible sexual assault. 3) For the knowing commission of any act of a 
severe form of trafficking in persons, the government of the country 
should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that 
adequately reflects the heinous nature of the offense. 4) The government 
of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate 
severe forms of trafficking in persons.19 
16 Average computed from 2008-2012 figures, USAID, “FY 2012 Total Foreign Assistance 
Profile: Colombia,” January 28, 2013, https://eads.usaid.gov/gbk/data/profile.cfm; Secretary of State, FY 
2014 Department of State Operations Congressional Budget Justification, vii, 173, 500, 520–21. 
17 Amnesty International, “U.S. Policy in Colombia,” accessed September 4, 2014, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/colombia/us-policy-in-colombia. 
18 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 43, 134. 
19 Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act.” 
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The first standard requires prohibition and punishment only in cases of “severe forms of 
trafficking in persons.”20 The second and third standards deal exclusively with the legal 
status of human trafficking in, requiring certain laws be enacted that carry appropriate 
minimum sentences but carrying no explicit requirement for enforcement of said laws. 
And while the fourth standard is all about, it is incredibly subjective, suggesting—still 
not requiring—that “the government of the country should make serious and sustained 
efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons.”21  
The TVPA recommends evaluators study certain factors when ranking a country’s 
efforts. In determining “serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of 
trafficking in persons,” officials should consider whether the government does the 
following: 
• “vigorously” investigates and prosecutes serious human trafficking crimes, 
protects and assists victims, 
• adopts measures to prevent trafficking in persons, 
• cooperates with other governments on such matters, extradites perpetrators 
when appropriate, 
• monitors immigration and emigration patterns to identify and circumvent 
human trafficking, and 
• “vigorously” investigates and prosecutes public officials complicit in 
human trafficking.22 
In sum, governments should seriously try to eliminate human trafficking, and officials 
should consider their efforts when determining rankings. Even if the word must is 
substituted for should, evaluators are still responsible for deciding, in their own opinion, 
whether or not a government’s efforts meet the threshold of “serious and sustained.”23 
Regardless of Colombia’s ranking, the United States remains committed to aiding 
the country. While the U.S. Department of State indicates that the United States’ primary 
interests in Colombia are centered on the illicit drug trade and spreading state control into 
20 Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act.” 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Department of State. The Office of Website Management, “Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act.” 
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areas controlled by insurgent and paramilitary groups, it acknowledges that the threat 
from human trafficking remains a national security concern.24 Moreover, as this thesis 
explains, drug trafficking and limited state control are linked in very important ways to 
human trafficking. Thus, to successfully reduce human trafficking, the two governments 
must first understand why Colombia continues to be a major source of human trafficking 
in the Western Hemisphere—what are the causal factors and how have policies in the 
region affected them? Until these questions are answered and funding, policies, and 
procedures are adjusted accordingly, the problem will persist.  
B. THE ARGUMENT 
This thesis argues that the Colombian government’s political will to combat 
human trafficking has been insufficient to overcome its capability gap. Internally, 
decades of political and drug-related conflicts have destroyed, corrupted, and diverted 
state capacity. This has left little power to prevent human trafficking, protect and care for 
its victims, or investigate, prosecute, and convict its perpetrators. Accordingly, most 
Colombian efforts to combat human trafficking have been prompted by external 
influences and abandoned before achieving substantive results. 
Armed insurgent groups, ungoverned territory, and the fight against the illicit 
drug trade are seen as paramount, leaving little time to focus on human trafficking. It 
could also be argued that eliminating these major problems is one of the best ways to 
increase capability to eradicate human trafficking. Yet, the manner in which governments 
now fight against them is making the situation worse; the international community may 
need to redefine what it means to combat insurgency, drugs, and human trafficking 
within Colombia. Based on available evidence, the active presence of large, armed, 
nongovernmental groups is the major factor inhibiting Colombia’s capacity and will to 
combat human trafficking, resulting in no significant reduction to the problem over at 
least the last fourteen years. 
24 Secretary of State, FY 2014 Department of State Operations Congressional Budget 
Justification, 173; Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Colombia,” Fact Sheet, 
U.S. Department of State, (November 19, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm. 
 6 
                                                 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a single case study of Colombia. It draws resources from some 
primary governmental, news media, non-governmental, and international organizational 
sources as well as many secondary academic sources. U.S. government sources provide 
credible data on relationships and transactions with Colombia, and data from the 
Colombian government is useful in assessing how Colombian officials behave and report 
human trafficking within their own country. International sources like the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) provide some of the most substantive material available on the subject of human 
trafficking, and NGOs working in the region supply insightful firsthand knowledge on 
the subject. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized starting with large concepts–defining human trafficking is 
and why it is a problem, along with the organizations that set the standards for fighting 
it—then moves onto specifics, such as the nature of human trafficking in Colombia and 
what is currently being done to combat it. Chapter II delves into the human trafficking 
problem both generally and as it exists in Colombia, and reviews literature on the 
subjects. Chapter III discusses Colombian programs and efforts to combat human 
trafficking over the last fifteen years, identifying a common pattern of failure and neglect. 
Chapter IV addresses the links between drug trafficking and human trafficking in 
Colombia, showing how the former helps facilitate the latter. Chapter V provides a 
critical analysis of U.S. policy in Colombia and the Latin American region as an 
inflammatory factor in the human trafficking situation. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes 
the major findings and explores the way ahead in combating human trafficking in 
Colombia.   
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II. THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING PROBLEM AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
Literature on human trafficking in Colombia tends to focus on one or two 
individual aspects, without attempting to tie all relevant information into a complete 
causal flow that could be used to identify the root causes and explain how past and 
current anti-human trafficking efforts affect the issue. Researchers have written about 
problems involving definitions and victim identification; quantifying the problem; 
victimization factors; the legal system; and demand, corruption, and complacency. 
However, the relationship between Colombian capability and will to combat human 
trafficking, and the barriers to success, requires further analysis, which this thesis 
provides. 
A. DEFINING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Human trafficking is different from the smuggling of migrants, which is defined 
as “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident.”25 Willing subjects of migrant smuggling, however, 
risk becoming victims to human trafficking as they place themselves under the power of 
the smugglers in a country where they are strangers and have arrived illegally.26 A 
portion of human trafficking involves migrant smuggling, but many trafficked individuals 
initially pass between states legally, and others never leave their country of origin. In this 
sense, trafficking is a bit of a misnomer, as it typifies only one subset of the problem—
victims transported across state boundaries. Article 3, paragraph (a) of the UN Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (hereafter referred to as the 
Protocol) establishes the internationally accepted definition of human trafficking: 
25 United Nations, Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 41. 
26 Kristof Van Impe, “People for Sale: The Need for a Multidisciplinary Approach towards 
Human Trafficking,” International Migration 38, no. 3 (January 1, 2000): 113–14, doi:10.1111/1468-
2435.00117. 
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The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.27 
Because human trafficking involves a wide range of activities, and even consent is 
irrelevant in the case of a child (under eighteen years old), the stereotype of a victim who 
is abducted and sold into prostitution or slavery in a foreign country describes only a 
small portion of the problem.28 
The Protocol defines the crime so broadly that many trafficked individuals are not 
recognized as such by the general community.29 For example, because she is not a 
stereotypical victim, a woman engaging in forced prostitution in her own country is less 
likely to be identified than someone in a similar situation operating in a foreign state 
mainly because the former seems less out of place. Considering that commercial sexual 
exploitation claims an estimated 75 percent of all human trafficking victims, the majority 
of which are intranational, victim identification is a major obstacle.30 In an article for 
Crime and Justice, Martti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa estimated “60–80 percent of 
trafficking for sexual exploitation is domestic, and the bulk of cross-border trafficking is 
regional.”31 In other words, a crime that is publicly thought to involve movement across 
international borders, usually does not. Consequently, many victims are harder to detect. 
27 United Nations. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 32. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Field Listing: Trafficking in Persons,” 
accessed May 26, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2196.html. 
31 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 133. 
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Like most of the world, the preponderance of victims detected in South America 
(89.4 percent between 2007 and 2010) were trafficked within the region.32 Globally, the 
instances of known domestic trafficking rose from 19 to 31 percent between 2007 and 
2010.33 These figures, however, are likely understated, as government officials have 
historically tended to view human trafficking as primarily an international problem, 
creating a black hole for investigation and reporting involving citizens still in their own 
countries.34 Consequently, the apparent surge in domestic trafficking may be more a 
reflection of greater sensitivity to the problem than an actual increase in victims. 
B. CHARACTERIZING THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 
Even with a workable definition, it is impossible to measure the true scope of 
human trafficking. Lehti and Aromaa declared that “accurate information on the volume 
of the crime does not exist,” due to poor and varied definitions, deficient data-collection 
and reporting, and victims inability or unwillingness to report crimes and participate in 
prosecuting perpetrators.35 Because of this, many researchers have been quick to latch 
onto anything that looks like a solid number and taken the source reliability for granted. 
One commonly reported number provides a good insight to this problem. A 2013 article 
claiming to reveal the extent of human trafficking in Colombia reported that “an 
estimated 70,000 people fall victim to human trafficking in Colombia every year.”36 This 
number, however, was taken from a different article published a few days prior that cited 
a 2012 article from another source that had pulled the number from an estimate the IOM 
allegedly mentioned in a UN radio broadcast from 2003 (which is no longer available for 
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012 
(New York: United Nations, 2012), 42, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/glotip/Trafficking_in_Persons_2012_web.pdf. 
33 Ibid., 51. 
34 Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2013), 132, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/index.htm. 
35 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 142. 
36 Charles Parkinson, “Report Reveals Extent of Human Trafficking in Colombia,” InSightCrime, 
November 18, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/report-reveals-extent-of-human-trafficking-
in-colombia. 
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verification).37 Multiple other reports and articles have referenced the same number, 
attributing it to different dates and sources that ultimately lead back to the same 
unverifiable origin.38 Even if the original broadcast were available, the number remains a 
self-declared, and inherently unreliable, estimate. 
To combat the lack of quantifiable data, organizations commonly use other 
methods such as the number of victims that self-identify in surveys, other government 
identified victims, investigations initiated, prosecutions, and convictions of human 
trafficking offenses to estimate the scope of the problem. Colombia, for instance, had 207 
registered cases of human trafficking in between 2005 and 2010, of which 170 involved 
sexual exploitation, 30 were for forced labor, 2 for begging, and 5 for servile marriage; 
187 of the cases were international and 20 domestic.39 Even officially reported numbers, 
however, are unreliable since poor and varied definitions of human trafficking and a lack 
of good data collection within individual countries complicate accurate assessments.40 
Colombia, for example, reported 65 convictions for human trafficking crimes between 
2005 and 2010, but, following an internal government study, later said a more accurate 
number was 26.41 
Victimization surveys in Colombia showed an average of 76 percent of all crimes 
go unreported, with homicide and car theft (for insurance reasons) being the only two 
37 Women’s Link Worldwide, La Trata Y La Explotación En Colombia: No Se Quiere Ver, No Se 
Puede Hablar, November 15, 2013, 
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo=detalle_proyectos&tp=proyectos&dc=71&lan
g=en; La Fundación Esperanza, “Metamorfosis de La Esclavitud: Manual Juridico Sobre Trata de 
Personas” (Bogotá, Colombia: La Fundación Esperanza, 22 April 13), 18, 
http://observatoriodemigraciones.org/librosfundaci%C3%B3n.shtml?apc=g-xx-1-&x=37. 
38 Wells, “Rise of Human Trafficking within Colombia”; Helda Martinez, “Trafficking Victims’ 
Ordeal Never Over,” Inter Press Service, June 10, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/06/rights-colombia-
trafficking-victimsrsquo-ordeal-never-over/. 
39 Vargas Trujillo, Flórez, and Mendoza Simonds, Trata de Personas En Colombia, 50. 
40 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, International Framework for Action: To Implement 
the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (New York: United Nations, 2009), 6, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Framework_for_Action_TIP.pdf. 
41 Data compiled from 2006 through 2011 annual TIP reports (pages 94, 82, 95, 108, 116, and 125 
respectively) at U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report”; Vargas Trujillo, Flórez, and 
Mendoza Simonds, Trata de Personas En Colombia, 46. 
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with moderately reliable reporting.42 Trafficking is among the worst-reported crimes with 
only about 40,000 victims identified globally in 2012—less than 0.2 percent of the 
estimated total. The inability to quantify the extent of human trafficking inhibits useful 
research and complicates combating the problem. Some words that keep cropping up in 
human trafficking research are detected, reported, estimated, and unknown, all of which 
indicate the inherent fallibility of existing quantitative research. 
There is substantive data available on a number of victimization susceptibility 
issues prevalent in Colombia, but with very little said to tie them into a coherent whole or 
differentiate between causal and incidental factors. The groups most vulnerable include 
internally displaced persons, minority groups, and those closely associated with criminal 
organizations.43 According to the IOM, “personal characteristics common among 
trafficking victims…include a tendency to take risks in order to fulfill one’s goals, a 
focus on short-term rewards that may result from short-term risks, and a lack of familial 
support and/or strong social networks.”44  
Women and children are the two groups most likely to become victims of human 
trafficking in Colombia. Sexual exploitation is the gravest trafficking problem in 
Colombia, and females represent 98 percent of the victims worldwide.45 Children make 
up 27 percent of detected trafficking victims in the region.46 According to Louise Shelley 
in Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective, “traffickers prey on the vulnerable: 
individuals without parents or with ailing parents, single mothers seeking ways to support 
their children, the desperately poor, and refugees from conflicts”—all of which are 
42 Elvira Maria Restrepo, “The Pursuit of Efficiency and the Colombian Criminal Justice 
System,” in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, ed. Marcelo 
Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 180–181, 
194, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10423319. 
43 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 131. 
44 Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 4. 
45 Philip Hunter, ed., Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat 
Human Trafficking (United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, 2010), 17, 
http://www.ilo.org/sapfl/Informationresources/NonILOpublications/WCMS_142722/lang--en/index.htm. 
46 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, 14. 
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readily available in Colombia.47 In general, children are more vulnerable than adults due 
to their lack of life experience, dependence on others, and social and legal standing.48 
Moreover, a full one-third of Colombian children spend some time during childhood 
without a father, and it is not unusual for children to live away from parents with other 
family members or friends—an arrangement increasing their susceptibility to trafficking 
since they are in the care of people who generally know and care for them less.49 
Women are more vulnerable than men based on physical strength and because 
many societies disempower women, providing them with lesser access to education, 
work, and legal services.50 In Colombia, there is a “lingering machismo (chauvinistic 
attitudes and practices) that tends to lead to discrimination against women and girls,” 
which not only places them at increased risk of trafficking and other violent crimes, but 
also makes their cases less likely to draw serious attention from authorities.51 
Nevertheless, women and children are not the only victims of trafficking in Colombia; 
trafficked men usually end up doing manual-labor type work. According to the United 
Nations, there are approximately 250,000 people in forced labor in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a result of human trafficking.52 Within Colombia, victims of forced labor 
often participate in domestic service, mining, and agriculture, producing products such as 
bricks, coal, coffee, emeralds, gold, pornography, and sugarcane.53  
Forced labor flourishes in Colombia because workers have little protection against 
it. Typically unionizing can help a repressed workforce; however, changes in the labor 
47 Louise Shelley, Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 95. 
48 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, 15. 
49 Elżbieta M. Goździak, “On Challenges, Dilemmas, and Opportunities in Studying Trafficked 
Children,” Anthropological Quarterly 81, no. 4 (2008): 916. 
50 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, 15. 
51 Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 4; Annsley Chapman and 
Cheryl Seelhoff, “Femicide Epidemic Spreads,” Off Our Backs 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2006): 6. 
52 Hunter, Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human 
Trafficking, 17. 
53 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 131; Bureau of International 
Labor Affairs, “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor,” U.S. Department of Labor, 
September 30, 2013, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods. 
 14 
                                                 
market, anti-trade union policies, and, most notably, violence against trade unionists have 
driven membership down to less than 5 percent of Colombian workers—the lowest level 
in the Americas.54 From 2002 to 2010, murders of Colombian trade unionists have 
ranged from 39 to 191 each year.55 Additionally, the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a 
Colombian labor research center, reported on violence other than murder, stating that in 
2010 alone there were “seven cases of forced disappearances, 21 assassination attempts, 
35 forced displacements, five kidnappings, three arbitrary detentions and 338 death 
threats against trade unionists.”56 The ENS also pointed out that “in 95.6 percent of cases 
involving the murder of trade unionists since 1986, there have been no convictions.”57 
C. INTERNAL CONFLICT AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN COLOMBIA 
Compounding the problem, traffickers often operate in “zones of impunity” and 
prey on vulnerable populations unlikely to seek help from authorities.58 Insurgency and 
paramilitary groups such as the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
participate in human trafficking in Colombia, often in large areas outside of government 
control.59 A report prepared for the United Nations Security council stated that “Boys 
and girls as young as 8 years old are recruited, often forcibly, into armed groups, 
paramilitaries, and militias in Colombia. They face harsh punishments, including death if 
they attempt to desert. They are used as combatants, spies, messengers, porters, 
kidnappers, guards, cooks, sexual companions, human shields, and for placing bombs.”60 
As of 2003, Human Rights Watch reported that at least 25 percent of irregular 
54 Justice for Colombia, “About Colombia,”, accessed May 18, 2014, 
http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/about-colombia/. 
55 Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Republic of Colombia Labor Rights Report 




58 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 8–9. 
59 John Rapley, “The New Middle Ages,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 96, 
doi:10.2307/20031970. 
60 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Child Soldiers: 1379 Report,” November 2002, 
23, https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/1379%20Report%20.pdf. 
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combatants in Colombia were children (with conservative estimates exceeding 11,000).61 
While most child combatants were probably not forced to join, they were often deceived 
into doing so.62 Irregular forces prey upon the children’s naïveté and dismal living 
conditions, promising them money and a better life; once volunteers learn the truth, it is 
too late.63 It did not help that there was little social stigma against child soldiers: it was 
not until 1999 that the Colombian government prohibited military recruitment of those 
under eighteen into their own forces.64 
D. INEQUALITY AND DISPLACEMENT AS HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
FACTORS 
Economic inequality further heightens the susceptibility of Colombians to become 
victims of human trafficking. While the economy has been growing at a fairly steady rate 
over the last three years, overall income distribution is quite unequal. Colombia’s Gini 
index (a measure of inequality in the distribution of family income) is 55.9, placing it as 
one of the ten worst of the 140 countries for which data is available, and a full third of the 
population lives below the poverty line.65 Considering the destitute state in which many 
Colombians live, it is understandable that some want to believe traffickers’ promises of a 
better life. Furthermore some victims may consider their exploitation preferable to other 
depravities and injustices they believe could await them outside their current situation (an 
idea often reinforced by their captors). 
These economic factors coupled with violence in rural areas have displaced many 
Colombians making them exponentially more vulnerable to trafficking. According to the 
Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia is the largest source of Latin American refugees 
in Latin America.”66 In 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that “after Sudan, Colombia 
61 Human Rights Watch, “You’ll Learn Not to Cry:” Child Combatants in Colombia (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 2003), 4–5, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/colombia0903.pdf. 
62 Ibid., 4, 6. 
63 Ibid., 10. 
64 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Child Soldiers,” 24. 




                                                 
has the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. In the last three years alone, nearly 5 
percent of Colombia’s 43 million people has been forcibly displaced…because of the 
country’s armed conflict.”67 War has displaced hundreds of thousands of women and 
children in Colombia, with the vast majority moving from rural to urban areas.68  These 
individuals “are disproportionately affected by unemployment, discrimination and lack of 
access to training opportunities to enter the labour market; they are therefore among the 
groups in the country that are most vulnerable to human trafficking.”69 While Colombia 
has a program to help the internally displaced, registration can be confusing and, of those 
that succeed, only about half received assistance which was usually limited to three 
months.70 
There is also a correlation between victimization and poor people moving out of 
rural areas and into affluent urban neighborhoods.71 This phenomenon holds true both 
domestically and internationally, where there are vast differences between industrialized 
and developing countries.72 Whether this relationship is more causal or incidental, 
however, requires further research. For, as Lehti and Aromaa point out, there is also a 
correlation between economic inequality, drugs, and prostitution (including trafficking 
for sexual exploitation).73 More directly, there is also a correlation between drug 
traffickers, insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists—all of which operate in Colombia—who 
use humans as a commodity that, unlike drugs, can be sold multiple times.74 In sum, 
there are a wide range of factors creating an unfortunate synergy wherein many 
67 Michael Bochenek, “Colombia: Displaced and Discarded: The Plight of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Bogotá and Cartagena,” Human Rights Watch 17, no. 4(B) (2005): 3, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/colombia1005.pdf. 
68 Human Rights Watch, Child Combatants in Colombia, 6; Bochenek, “Colombia,” 19. 
69 Hunter, Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human 
Trafficking, 41. 
70 Bochenek, “Colombia,” 4–5. 
71 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 133. 
72 Ibid., 138. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 87. 
 17 
                                                 
Colombians are more likely to take risks increasing their vulnerability to be trafficked 
and incentivizing traffickers to operate in the country. 
E. THE OFFICIAL COLOMBIAN POSITION ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Regardless of the nature and scope of human trafficking in Colombia, all aspects 
have been criminalized through Law 985, which prohibits “the capture, transfer, or 
receipt of a person within the country or overseas for the purposes of exploitation.”75 
Article 219 of the criminal code also penalizes organizing or facilitating sex tourism, but, 
as of 2013, authorities had not prosecuted anyone under the statute.76 Since 1971, the 
government has substantially reformed their criminal justice system several times and 
added many new laws.77 Some of the laws, however, address activities better handled 
outside the criminal system, so the net effect has been general inefficiency and a massive 
judicial backlog.78  
While Colombia has taken steps to restore efficiency, it has often been at the cost 
of quality. Judicial reforms started in 1991 created a special unit charged with all criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, the Fiscal General de la Nación (FGN), in an attempt to 
streamline the system.79 Arguably, however, the FGN has made conditions worse by 
generating efficiency but at the same time increasing arbitrariness through questionable 
legal practices.80 One of the biggest problems with the new system is that police 
effectiveness is being measured based on numbers of arrests, which incentivizes capture 
of petty thieves over more organized crimes such as human trafficking.81 Additionally, 
no single entity handles internal trafficking, and some police officers in the local sex 
75 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, 
122. 
76 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133. 
77 Restrepo, “The Pursuit of Efficiency and the Colombian Criminal Justice System,” 173–74. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 175. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 180. 
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crimes units that investigate them have “solicited bribes or sexual services in exchange 
for protecting brothels where trafficking victims were exploited.”82  
Strong anti-trafficking laws will have little to no impact on the scope of the 
problem if implementation is sporadic and punishment is unlikely. As Shelley points out, 
in contrast to narcotics traffickers, “few human traffickers are incarcerated and almost 
none have lost the proceeds of their crime.”83 Mark Ungar and Ana Laura Magaloni 
explain that, “for the system to work as a deterrent, citizens and potential delinquents 
must perceive that the detention and punishment of offenders is likely,” but that “penal 
institutions in Latin America are unable to apprehend dangerous delinquents efficiently, 
which means that the deterrence does not work well in that region.”84 Likewise, “lack of 
interagency coordination and adequate resources hinder efforts to more effectively 
combat child labor and human trafficking.”85 Additionally, while the FARC and other 
non-state armed groups continue to recruit children from Colombia, Ecuador and 
Panama, the Colombian government has not broached the issue during ongoing peace 
negotiations.86 
Colombia partially justifies its slow progress as a failure of the international 
community. In a 2008 statement to the United Nations, Maria Isabel Nieto, Colombia’s 
Vice-Minister of Interior, claimed “Colombia is a leader in the fight against Human 
Trafficking, not only in Latin America, but also in the Western Hemisphere,” but 
lamented that “in spite of the efforts, to date the international response to Human 
82 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2011), 126, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/index.htm. 
83 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 88. 
84 Mark Ungar and Ana Laura Magaloni, “Latin America’s Prisons: A Crisis of Criminal Policy 
and Democratic Rule,” in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, 
ed. Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 
244. 
85 Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2012 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2013), 157, 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/2012TDA.pdf. 
86 Ibid., 158. 
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Trafficking has proved partial and insufficient.”87 She called for the “adoption of 
concrete actions…in accordance with the principle of shared responsibility” to the 
worldwide problem.88 For Ms. Nieto, demand and complacency are the primary 
problems. 
F. FEAR IMPEDES THE FIGHT AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Fear is another great inhibitor of the criminal justice system, and Colombia has 
done little to ensure the safety of victims who wish to come forward. Victims worry not 
only about themselves, but also their families at home since they are often the subject of 
coercive threats—threats that traffickers do not make idly.89 For this reason, the U.S. 
Department of State Trafficking in Persons reports have consistently cited problematic 
witness protection programs as a contributing factor to the strangled success of anti-
trafficking efforts in the country. Using words such as “limited,” “underfunded,” 
“ineffective,” and “inadequate,” the reports describe a system that is unable to overcome 
the victims’ reluctance to testify.90 Fear not only keeps victims and witnesses from 
cooperating with the criminal justice system, but also affects officials. Public prosecutors, 
investigators, and judges must choose to either absolve criminals, “or condemn the culprit 
but pay with their life or at the cost of the safety or tranquility of their families.”91 
Between 1979 and 1991, “forty judges per year were the victims of violence,” and even 
after legally safeguarding the anonymity of judges and prosecutors working on serious 
crimes, “the level of violence against judges in Colombia is still high by international 
standards.”92 Again, the danger of retribution is significantly higher in cases of organized 
87 Maria Isabel Nieto, “Colombia Mission to UN Statement on Human Trafficking” (United 
Nations, June 3, 2008), 
http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/humantrafficking/colombia.pdf. 
88 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
89 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 109. 
90 Information drawn from report years 2001 through 2013 and the respective page numbers are as 
follows: 18, 40, 48, 230, 85, 94, 82, 95, 108, 116, 125, 121, and 133 at U.S. Department of State, 
“Trafficking in Persons Report.” 
91 Restrepo, “The Pursuit of Efficiency and the Colombian Criminal Justice System,” 194. 
92 Ibid., 196–97. 
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crime; therefore “Even when publicly known hard criminals are caught, there is often no 
evidence to prosecute them.”93 
G. THE DEMAND SIDE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Of course, if there were no demand for the products of human trafficking, there 
would be few perpetrators needing prosecution. Like the illegal drug trade, researchers 
have made a strong case for understanding the importance of human trafficking demand 
on rates of victimization. To remain competitive in domestic and international markets 
for these goods, it helps to be able to pay your workers as little as possible, and human 
trafficking is a tempting source of cheap labor. Additionally, the legal nature of 
prostitution in Latin America and other areas of the world fuels human trafficking for 
sexual exploitation and complicates victim detection. Experts estimate somewhere 
between 400,000 and 2,500,000 victims are trafficked annually in the Americas, with 
Colombia being one of the top-three source countries.94 Citizens are routinely trafficked 
within the country and region as well as to other areas of the world including Belgium, 
Britain, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, and the United 
States.95 All of these countries have legal or limitedly legal prostitution.96 Neither the 
UN nor the U.S. protocols on human trafficking directly address the issue of prostitution; 
consequently, there is no correlation between prostitution laws and TVPA tier ranking.  
As with most crimes, human trafficking is a covert activity that may be difficult to 
identify even when interacting with the perpetrators or victims. Not all women engaged 
in the sex trade are victims of trafficking, not all migrant workers are performing forced 
labor, and not everyone engaged in human smuggling is participating in human 
trafficking. While the uncertainty of victimization frustrates those actively working to 
93 Ibid., 195. 
94 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 199. 
95 Ibid., 202. 
96 ProCon.org, “100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies,” November 4, 2009, 
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772; Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm. 
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eradicate the problem, it has the inverse effect on those who indirectly profit from it. For 
example, shoppers looking for the lowest price can ignore the paltry wages paid to some 
workers and johns can justify paying for sex—they just have to tell themselves that some 
people might be exploited, but certainly not the ones they know about; they are just 
people who are willing to do some unsavory things because they need the money. In the 
Netherlands, for example, which is one of the top countries of export for Colombians 
trafficked into the sex industry, “Amsterdam’s Red Light District is a major tourist 
destination for buyers seeking commercial sexual services.”97 Many women there are 
trapped by pimps who charge them exorbitant amounts for rent and other necessities and 
often keep their legal documents to ensure the women cannot escape.98 
Corruption and complicity in business and government inhibit otherwise effective 
anti-trafficking measures.99 Louise Shelley, a leading U.S. expert on transnational crime, 
argues that “the profits involved and the demand for trafficked people are so significant 
that awareness campaigns are not enough to prevent the continued growth of trafficking 
and smuggling.”100 There is a strong push-pull force incentivizing criminals to facilitate 
human trafficking; potential victims to be less wary than they should; and customers, 
beneficiaries, and government officials to ignore probable indicators. Shelley reasons that 
trafficking could not exist without the legitimate community’s complicity.101 She 
explains that “newspapers run advertisements for escort services, apartment owners rent 
to brothel keepers, hotels even facilitate trafficking rings by providing women to their 
customers,” and “factories contract with human smugglers and traffickers to provide 
them needed manpower even though these employers know these workers have no work 
97 Shared Hope International, “Demand: A Comparative Examination of Sex Tourism and 
Trafficking in Jamaica, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States” (September 2009), 49, 
http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/DEMAND.pdf. 
98 Ibid., 52–53. 
99 Louise Shelley, “Human Trafficking as a Form of Transnational Crime,” in Human Trafficking, 




                                                 
permits.”102 In short, the very people in positions to identify and curtail trafficking are 
often those actively or passively supporting it.103 
H. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, researchers have said a lot about human trafficking in Colombia, 
but what remains is to tie it all together. An analysis is needed that identifies the main 
barriers to progress, including specific programs and their likely reasons for failure, and 
illuminates the correlation between capability and will to eliminate human trafficking in 
Colombia. This thesis provides just such a critical examination, without which anti-
human trafficking efforts are doomed to remain ineffective. 
  
102 Ibid. 
103 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 103. 
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III. COLOMBIAN ANTI-TRAFFICKING PROGRAMS AND 
EFFORTS 
When the United States first officially identified Colombia as a major source for 
human trafficking, U.S. officials also hailed the Colombian government as a leader in the 
fight against human trafficking. From the first Trafficking in Persons report in 2001 
through the 2013 publication, the U.S. Department of State ranked Colombia as a “Tier 1 
state”—the top grade—signifying full compliance with the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000’s minimum standards for the elimination of human 
trafficking.104 In 2004, the U.S. Department of State praised: 
The [Colombian] government has shown political will at the highest levels 
to address one of the largest national outflows of trafficking victims in the 
Western Hemisphere, brought about by a guerrilla insurgency and narco-
criminal enterprises. In response, the government’s inter-agency 
committee is a model for the hemisphere: coordinating prevention 
campaigns, promoting law enforcement, launching a criminal database, 
and facilitating intra-government cooperation.105 
Ten years later, the State Department dropped Colombia’s top-tier ranking for the first 
time, citing, among other issues, the lack of any “tangible results” in efforts to combat 
human trafficking from the previously-lauded model program.106 What happened to 
cause such a dramatic change in Colombia’s anti-trafficking efforts? The simple answer 
is: almost nothing.  
Colombian government efforts seldom rose above the bare minimum required to 
placate U.S. officials and “earn” a Tier 1 ranking—it just took a while for the United 
States to start ranking Colombia based on merit rather than political goodwill. This 
chapter argues that the Colombian government has focused its anti-trafficking efforts 
104 For annual Tier 1 rankings, see the Colombia country section in reports dated 2001 through 
2013 U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report”; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report: 2001 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2001), 5, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/4107.pdf. 
105 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2004), 230, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/index.htm. 
106 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137. 
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mainly on high-profile problems as necessary to remain in the good graces of the 
international community, while doing little to resolve the underlying issues or enforce 
preventative measures domestically. This chapter will discuss the Colombian legal 
framework against human trafficking then analyze the government’s actions and 
inactions regarding sex tourism, public awareness, anti-trafficking organization, training, 
victim protection, and prosecution of perpetrators. 
A. THE COLOMBIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 
Laws are the foundation for a solid anti-trafficking program, and Colombia has 
created a suitable set of them. In 1996, Colombian President Ernesto Samper Pizano 
established the Interinstitutional Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons (Comité 
Interinstitucional para la Lucha contra el Tráfico de Mujeres).107 As justification, he cited 
article 13 of the Colombian National Constitution, which holds that “all people are born 
free and equal before the law and establishes a State obligation to protect the weak and 
punish any abuse or mistreatment perpetrated against them.”108 The government enacted 
a law in 2001 that established human trafficking as a distinct crime, then broadened the 
definition and stiffened penalties in 2002 and 2004.109 In August of 2005, the 
government enacted Law 985 of 2005, “making a victim’s consent to his or her 
movement irrelevant in proving whether trafficking has occurred,” and formally charging 
“the Interinstitutional Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons, headed by the 
Minister of Interior and Justice, with coordinating antitrafficking policies and developing 
107 La Republica de Colombia Decreto 1974 de 1996, 1974, vol. 42.912, 1996, 
http://www.icbf.gov.co/cargues/avance/docs/decreto_1974_1996.htm. 
108 Ibid. My translation. 
109 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2002 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2002), 40, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2002/index.htm; U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2003 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003), 48, 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/index.htm; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons 
Report: 2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005), 85, 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/index.htm. 
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a comprehensive national action plan.”110 At this point, Colombia had laid a solid legal 
framework for human trafficking prevention, victim assistance, and criminal prosecution. 
B. A CASE STUDY OF CHILD SEX TOURISM IN COLOMBIA 
In addition to standard human trafficking laws, the government recognized the 
plight of minors ensnared in the business of sex tourism in Colombia and took steps to 
ward off the practice. A candid quote by a retired U.S. schoolteacher in 2007 is indicative 
of the nature of the sex-tourism problem:  
On this trip, I’ve had sex with a 14-year-old girl in Mexico and a 15-year-
old in Colombia. I’m helping them financially. If they don’t have sex with 
me, they may not have enough food. If someone has a problem with me 
doing this, let UNICEF feed them.111 
Employees of Fundación Renacer, a civil service organization in Colombia that is 
“dedicated to eradicating the commercial sexual exploitation of boys, girls, and 
adolescents,” help describe the Colombian sex trafficking environment.112 In 2008, a 
news website quoted Mayerlin Verqara Perez, a Fundación Renacer program coordinator, 
as saying: “It’s become a lot worse in the last 10 years…there are more children doing 
sex work and they’re starting younger.”113 In another interview for the same news outlet, 
Fabian Cardenas, regional director of Fundación Renacer, explained that the situation 
was complicated because adults were facilitating the trade: 
“The authorities are doing a lot of surveillance, but the simple fact of 
looking like a tourist means you’re likely to be offered these things by 
people working in the informal tourism industry.” Cardenas said it was 
common for male tourists to be approached by waiters, bellhops and taxi 
drivers offering introductions to sex workers and escort services. Even the 
110 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2006), 94–95, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/. 
111 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2008), 15, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/index.htm. 
112 Fundación Renacer, “Quiénes Somos Nosotros,” accessed February 3, 2015, 
http://fundacionrenacer.org/?p=12. 
113 PlusNews, “Colombia: Sex Tourism Booming on the Caribbean Coast,” IRINnews, November 
18, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report/81528/colombia-sex-tourism-booming-on-the-caribbean-coast. 
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drivers of the horse-drawn carriages that ferry tourists around the old city 
earn a commission for delivering clients to sex clubs.114  
In response to the sexual trafficking of minors, the Colombian government amended 
Article 219-A of the Colombian criminal code in 2008 to make offering or facilitating the 
sexual services of minors a crime punishable by a prison term from ten to fourteen years 
and a monetary fine.115 Additionally, the government “targeted and provided information 
to tourism industries in 23 Colombian cities to prevent commercial sexual 
exploitation.”116 Again, it seemed as though the government was off to a good start. 
Nevertheless, a new law and some propaganda were not enough to make the sex 
tourism problem shrink substantially. Fundación Renacer claims on their website home 
page that 48,915 sexual victims younger than 18 years old were identified in Colombia 
between 2008 and 2012.117 While the source of this number is not apparent and may be 
inflated, the Colombian government also indicated a continuing problem within the 
Country. The Colombian Child Welfare Institute (ICBF), a government agency, cited 49 
cases of child sex tourism in 2011 and “reported identifying 415 children in prostitution 
through September 2012.”118 Admittedly, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the 
numbers reported by the Colombian government (which is likely low) and Fundación 
Renacer (which is likely high), but the fact remains that sex trafficking of minors 
remained a known issue in Colombia. Consequently, the government tried again in 2012, 
developing a national strategy geared toward “the prevention of sexual exploitation of 
children in the context of travel and tourism,” in which it “worked with civil society to 
certify hotels and tourism establishments committed to combating sexual exploitation of 
114 Ibid. 
115 Delitos Contra L a Libertad, Integridad Y Formación Sexuales, Ley 1236, vol. 47.059, 2008, 
http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Ley_1236_de_2008_Colombia.pdf. 
116 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2009 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2009), 108–109, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm. 
117 Fundación Renacer, “Fundación Renacer,” accessed February 3, 2015, 
http://fundacionrenacer.org/. 
118 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2012), 123, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm; U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 132. 
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children.”119 This pattern of creating new laws, strategies, and propaganda, however, was 
sabotaged by a lack of dedicated follow-through.  
While the necessary human trafficking laws were in place, officials never closed 
the loop with the criminal justice system. Despite clear evidence that many individuals 
were offering and facilitating the sexual services of minors (acts strictly prohibited by 
Colombian law in 2008), as of the 2014 Trafficking in Persons report, Colombia had not 
convicted anyone under the statute.120 Ironically, Canada has used a similar law multiple 
times, including at least once  for offenses committed in Colombia. In July 2010, the 
Canadian Press reported that a judge had ordered 11 years in prison for a 59 year-old 
man who was caught trying to ship home 21 homemade DVDs chronicling his sexual 
exploits with minors and who “admitted to having sex with girls ranging in age from 
eight to 14” in Colombia and Cambodia.121  
The lack of convictions cannot be tied to elimination of the problem through other 
means, because it has not stopped. Recent reporting indicates that sex tourism is still a 
major problem in Colombia—and the government knows it. In October 2014, the Miami 
Herald reported that “Colombian and U.S. authorities, working with two nonprofit 
groups, staged three simultaneous raids in the cities of Cartagena, Medellin and Armenia. 
By the time the busts were over, 55 children, some as young as 11 and 12, had been 
rescued from sex-traffickers.”122 That same year, Colombian authorities, in conjunction 
with United States Immigration and Customs, arrested nine people, including a former 
119 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133. 
120 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 123; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 
133; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137. 
121 Terri Theodore, “Crown Wants 12-Year Term for Cdn Sex Tourist Who Abused in Colombia, 
Cambodia,” Canadian Press, July 22, 2010, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/645277584/6F1E174C6DD24778PQ/5?accountid=12
702; Tamsyn Burgmann, “Cdn Sex Tourist Gets 11 Years for Sex with Young Girls in Colombia, 
Cambodia,” Canadian Press, July 28, 2010, 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/733077462/6F1E174C6DD24778PQ/6?accountid=12
702. 
122 Jim Wyss, “Authorities Seek U.S. Links After Colombian Child-Sex Sting,” Miami Herald, 
October 30, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/world/americas/colombia/article3470873.html. 
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beauty pageant queen, on child-prostitution charges.123 Commenting on the raids, Luis 
Gonzalez, with Colombia’s attorney general’s office, admitted that child-sex trafficking 
“is a problem that worries us greatly because it’s growing exponentially.”124 As the 
Miami Herald reported: “Not only is the government seeing an increase in the number of 
travelers searching for underage sex, but it has also detected larger, more-sophisticated 
operations; ‘one of the things that worries us is the link between business conferences and 
the illegal sex trade,’ Gonzalez said.”125 Regardless of how worried the government 
actually is or not, the fact remains that up until now they have failed to use the legislation 
in place to help fight child sex tourism.  
While the more recent raids noted above might indicate a renewed interest in 
curtailing the sex trade in Colombia, it is unlikely a concern originating from the 
Colombian government. Both anti-trafficking operations were done with U.S. assistance, 
illuminating once again the role external actors play on the Colombian government’s 
efforts to combat human trafficking. Colombia says all the right things and enacts the 
right laws, but usually only acts when induced to do so by international attention or 
pressure and usually fails with critical follow-through activities. 
Traffickers seem to have picked up on this hands-off approach. In spite of the 
raids and arrests, Colombians do not seem to be deterred from participating in the child 
sex-trade. Meredith Hoffman’s interview of a cabbie in Colombia in early 2015 illustrates 
this point well: 
Luis, a cabbie, told me he handles about 10 different prostitutes, some 
minors and some of legal age. He drives the girls to clients and takes 
passengers to the girl of their choice. ‘I have the luck of always picking up 
foreigners who come for this,’ Luis told VICE News. Fares give him 
anywhere between $30 and $100 for being taken to a girl, depending on 
123 Nicolas Bedoya, “Cartagena Beauty Queen Arrested in Child Sex Tourism Ring Bust,” 
Colombia Reports, October 14, 2014, http://colombiareports.co/beauty-queen-among-five-arrested-
cartagena-child-sex-tourism-ring-bust/. 
124 Wyss, “Colombian Child-Sex Sting.” 
125 Ibid. 
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how beautiful she is. ‘The underage girls always earn more, for being 
young.’126 
Luis seemed only too happy to reveal his participation in trafficking minors for sexual 
exploitation, even boasting that younger meant more money for him. It is quite likely that 
the reason the illicit Colombian trade in child sex continues to grow is because the 
government has yet to prove their commitment to solving the problem by prosecuting and 
convicting the individuals who facilitate it. It remains to be seen whether these most 
recent crackdowns will bear any fruit in court, but there is little historical evidence to 
believe that it will of its own accord. 
C. A CHALLENGE: LOW COLOMBIAN PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
As evidenced by the case of sex tourism and minors, combating human trafficking 
in Colombia requires more than just good laws; it requires the concerted participation of 
officials and the general citizenry. The reality is, however, that human rights violations 
such as trafficking in persons are not the top priority for most Colombians. 
AmericasBarometer conducted surveys in Colombia between 2005 and 2010, asking 
citizens what they believed to be the “gravest problem confronting Colombia” and giving 
them a number of options, ranging from “water” or “beggars” to “terrorism” and “human 
rights violations;” Table 1 lists the top responses.127 Despite an extensive list of 
documented human rights abuses by the government, military, and non-state actors in 
Colombia, issues of violence and unemployment greatly overshadow the problem.128 
126 Meredith Hoffman, “Sex Tourism Drives Underage Prostitution Boom in Cartagena, 
Colombia,” VICE News, January 7, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/sex-tourism-drives-underage-
prostitution-boom-in-cartagena-colombia. 
127 Data compiled from annual surveys between 2005 and 2010 in Latin American Public Opinion 
Project, “The AmericasBarometer,” accessed January 2, 2015, http://www.LapopSurveys.org. 
128 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices: Colombia (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2011), 1–2, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/index.htm; Latin American Public Opinion Project, 
“AmericasBarometer”; The only exception was 2008 when the Colombian military successfully rescued 
former Colombia presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and fourteen other hostages from the FARC, 
making international news and raising kidnapping up to the second gravest problem, which pushed 
unemployment to third. See Chris Kraul, “15 Hostages Freed as FARC Is Fooled in Cunning Operation,” 
Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-hostages3-2008jul03-
story.html#page=1. 
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Table 1.   Survey responses to the question “What is the gravest problem 
confronting Colombia?” indicate a low concern for human rights 
violations among Colombian citizens (answers are listed by year as a 
percentage of total answers).129 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Unemployment 23.77 23.77 20.71 13.21 26.06 28.89 
Violence 29.17 32.72 31.40 27.03 17.89 17.69 
Armed Conflict 8.44 4.12 6.47 8.99 4.25 4.02 
Economic Situation* 5.00 4.39 2.04 2.95 12.36 10.12 
Kidnapping 0.47 0.61 8.04 *22.07 2.30 1.81 
Human Rights Violations 0.27 0.27 0.61 0.20 0.54 0.54 
 
*In 2009 the potential response was changed from economy to economic problems/crisis 
**The Colombian military rescued fifteen FARC captives this year—a highly publicized 
event 
These survey answers should not be taken to mean that Colombians are ignorant 
of the human trafficking problem in their country—only that most acknowledge more 
immediate threats to their well-being. On the other hand, it must not be assumed that 
citizens are as aware as they should be about the prevalence of human trafficking and 
what they can do to inhibit its growth. Regardless of how one interprets the results, the 
argument remains: combatting human trafficking requires public assistance, and citizens 
will only become involved once they are convinced of the gravity of the problem. Hence, 
awareness campaigns are integral to any successful anti-trafficking strategy.  
D. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS—MORE FOR 
SHOW THAN EFFECT? 
Colombian officials, in concert with NGOs, have made multiple attempts to raise 
public awareness of human trafficking through a variety of media. For example, the 
Ministry of Justice worked in 2001 to include a trafficking story line into a national soap 
opera, and UNODC did the same in 2005.130 Between 2006 and 2008, the government 
worked with NGOs to spread awareness through print, radio, and television, sometimes 
129 Data compiled from annual surveys between 2005 and 2010 in Latin American Public Opinion 
Project, “AmericasBarometer.” 
130 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2002, 402006; U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2006, 35. 
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using celebrities to get the message out, and introduced an anti-trafficking website, which 
used the catchphrase: “the next victim could be you.”131 In 2010, the Ministry of 
Education formalized awareness efforts by adding trafficking in persons information to 
their sexual education curriculum.132 And, by the end of 2013, with the help of 
international organizations, every department in Colombia had established anti-
trafficking committees, a number of which may have initiated some form of local 
awareness campaigns.133 Thus, public awareness campaigns have operated fairly 
regularly in Colombia over the years. 
Certain awareness campaigns have also targeted specific populations at risk to 
human trafficking. In 2009, the National University of Colombia, the Ministry of the 
Interior and of Justice, and UNODC reported that “modeling and beauty competitions 
were the most widely employed means used by traffickers to lure young women into 
exploitative situations, including for the purpose of sexual exploitation.”134 In response, 
pageant coordinators distributed information on human trafficking identification and 
ways to avoid becoming a victim to 750 girls and 176 parents.135 In a more hands-on 
approach, beginning in 2002, and continuing through at least 2004, the government sent 
officials to try to identify potential victims at airports and inform them about the risks of 
human trafficking.136 During this time government agents were, reportedly, able to 
dissuade dozens of potential victims from boarding planes by telling them their job offers 
131 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2007), 82, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/index.htm; U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 
2009, 108–109. 
132 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, 2010), 117, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010/index.htm. 
133 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133. 
134 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “In Colombia, Beauty Pageant Contestants Get 




136 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2003, 48; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2004, 33, 230; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 
2005, 85. 
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were likely fraudulent and warning them of the potential dangers they faced.137 Given 
this information, it would seem that the Colombian government has been intent on 
curtailing human trafficking in the country. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the government’s efforts appear to be more for 
the international community’s benefit than for the victims of trafficking. While the 
Colombian government happily reported successes at airports, the U.S. Department of 
State warned that “Colombia’s land border and seaports are poorly monitored,” and 
“despite prevention efforts, this outbound trafficking continues largely unabated.”138 And 
at the same time the government was touting its ever-increasing number of anti-
trafficking committees, the U.S. Department of State reported that the committees 
“maintained varying degrees of activity and civil society actors noted that some existed in 
name only.”139 Moreover, in 2005, the U.S. Department of State admonished that the 
Colombian government “relied heavily on NGOs and international organizations to 
educate officials and the public about trafficking.”140 The themes of overreliance and 
showboating have continued to appear through current reporting.141  
Even one of the most promising programs has been neglected in spite of its 
apparent utility and popularity. In 2007 the government took over a national call center, 
which was originally set up by the IOM.142 The center operated as a human trafficking 
hotline for citizens to call with questions or to report suspected trafficking incidents, and 
received over 9,000 calls—mostly inquiries about the legitimacy of advertised job 
opportunities—before shutting down in 2010 due to a lack of funding.143 After reopening 
a little over a year later, it fielded some 8,000 calls in the first six months and was still 
137 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2003, 482; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2004, 33. 
138 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2004, 230. 
139 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133. 
140 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2005, 85. 
141 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137. 
142 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95. 
143 Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2009, 108–109; U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010, 117; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report: 2012, 123. 
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operating as of last reporting, but NGOs have recently reported that “the hotline was not 
always answered, and staff members were not adequately trained.”144 The lack of 
funding, personnel to answer phones, and proper training indicate better than any public 
statements the government’s level of dedication to the program: very low indeed. As the 
evidence piles up against Colombia, incidents that might be viewed as anomalies 
individually, together form a picture of governmental concern for appearances but 
debilitating lack of interest in committing the resources necessary to genuinely turn 
things around. 
E. A DEFUNCT ANTI-TRAFFICKING SYSTEM HAMPERS PROGRESS 
The Colombian government’s apathy toward human trafficking is further 
evidenced by the fundamental faults of its anti-trafficking system. The 2014 Trafficking 
in Persons report described, in part, the state of disrepair of Colombia’s anti-trafficking 
apparatus: 
While Colombian law penalizes all forms of trafficking, governmental 
structures and law enforcement practices did not reflect this 
comprehensive approach. Data collection remained strong on law 
enforcement efforts against transnational trafficking but was uneven on 
efforts against internal sex trafficking and forced labor. As in previous 
years, one prosecutor handled all transnational trafficking cases for the 
entire country and faced a significant caseload. The government assigned 
only one prosecutor in Bogotá to oversee cases of internal trafficking in 
the city, with no reduction in prior workload. Outside of Bogotá, local 
prosecutors handled internal trafficking cases as well as prosecutions for 
other crimes. Many of these prosecutors were overburdened, underfunded, 
and lacked trafficking expertise. Law enforcement officers reported that 
social workers and other officials interacting with potential trafficking 
victims, such as children in commercial sexual exploitation, did not 
always refer these cases for criminal investigation. In some cases, this was 
because officials inaccurately believed that it was permissible under 
Colombian law for a child between 14 and 18 to engage independently in 
commercial sex; any minor engaging in prostitution for the benefit of a 
third-party, including a family member, is a trafficking victim. Colombian 
authorities did not consider forced child recruitment by illegal armed 
groups to be human trafficking, but rather a war crime. Children forced to 
144 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 123; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137. 
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engage in criminal activity by organized criminal groups, as well as 
former child soldiers who did not leave illegal armed groups before 
turning 18, were not explicitly included in the trafficking definition in the 
law, and authorities did not investigate these cases as human 
trafficking.145 
These critiques highlight the systemic problem in Colombia of the government 
publicizing anti-trafficking programs but failing to achieve the promised outcomes 
because of subsequent neglect.  
One after another, programs and plans suffered from the Colombian advertise 
then neglect syndrome, wherein the government responded in a seemingly appropriate 
manner whenever a human trafficking issue garnered too much attention, only to abandon 
their resolve once the spotlight had moved on. In 2007, the U.S. Department of State 
reported that Colombia did not yet have “a formal mechanism for identifying trafficking 
victims among vulnerable populations, such as displaced persons or women in 
prostitution.”146 The Colombian government quickly responded that it had instituted a 
database—The Information Registry on Human Trafficking (RITRA)—that the IOM 
helped create and the Government of the Netherlands helped fund, meant to track and 
monitor statistics on trafficking cases, including victim information “to help determine 
areas where Colombians are vulnerable to being trafficked.”147 The Colombian 
government also stated it was working to open the Operational Anti-Trafficking in 
Persons Center (COAT) which would serve as a “central repository of anti-trafficking 
information for victims.”148 Again, it seemed that the government was taking appropriate 
measures to address its shortcomings in fighting human trafficking. 
These programs, however, never produced the intended outcome. Three years 
after implementing its database, Colombia released a government-sponsored study that 
145 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 135–36. 
146 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95. 
147 International Organization for Migration, “National Shared Database on Human Trafficking,” 
August 24, 2007, http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-
2007/pbn-listing/national-shared-database-on-human-traffi.html; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report: 2008, 94–95. 
148 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 94–95. 
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“noted a need to improve mechanisms for identifying victims of internal trafficking.”149 
In 2011, officials complained their “efforts to investigate trafficking crimes were limited 
by resources” and a government-sponsored study “highlighted the inconsistency in victim 
and case data from COAT from 2005 through 2010.”150 Later, human trafficking experts 
in Colombia admitted that while the state had created more than one database to gather 
and track human trafficking information, the government had yet to produce results.151 
Without reliable information, the battle against human trafficking in Colombia could gain 
little traction. 
Civil society also worried that Colombia had not properly equipped itself to fight 
human trafficking. Angela Ospina, Director of CPTP (a Colombian-based think tank on 
human trafficking), pointed out that the country had advanced laws against human 
trafficking, including Act 985 of 2005, but lacked the necessary resources for trafficking 
prevention and victim care.152 More problematic, in 2011, NGOs and international 
organizations (IOs) “expressed concern that some government officials had a limited 
understanding of human trafficking, and could therefore not effectively identify and assist 
victims.”153 Indeed, as of 2014, the U.S. Department of State was still reporting that the 
Colombian government was not “effectively employing formal procedures to identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations within the country,” and “civil society 
organizations were critical of the government’s ability to identify and assist trafficking 
victims within the country.”154 It is a poor commentary on the efficacy of human 
trafficking awareness campaigns in Colombia if the government officials charged with 
combatting human trafficking do not understand the subject well. 
149 U.S. Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 126. 
150 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 122. 
151 D. F., “Este Domingo, Miles de Razones Para Hablar de La Trata de Personas,” 
coopercom.CO, September 23, 2012, http://coopercom.co/inicio/35-internacionales/1022-este-domingo-
miles-de-razones-para-hablar-de-la-trata-de-personas-. 
152 Ibid. 
153 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 122. 
154 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 136. 
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F. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT TRAINING AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
If the Colombian government is to be believed, however, their officials should be 
well trained on human trafficking matters. Yet, the evidence shows a marked deficit in 
understanding. Since at least 2001, the Colombian government has been working with 
NGOs and using international assistance to train police and government officials in 
combatting human trafficking and aiding victims.155 The government reported 
coordinating with an IO in 2011 to train more than 400 officials and hundreds more in 
2012; they trained prosecutors, judicial officials, police, and other government officials 
on investigating and prosecuting human trafficking cases and assisting trafficking 
victims.156 Additionally, the national government encouraged each department to 
implement its own anti-trafficking committee and happily reported that, by 2009, fifteen 
departments had established theirs, with eleven more added the next year, and anti-
trafficking committees in all thirty-two departments by the end of 2011.157 To show off 
its exemplar programs, the government put on a “national workshop for these 
departmental committees to share challenges and best practices,” during which 
“Colombian authorities hosted visiting delegations from Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, and 
Panama, and shared best practices from the anti-trafficking center with these 
delegations.”158 Once more, Colombia appeared to be on the right track but the fruits of 
their labors would tell a different story. 
By 2011, individuals inside and outside the Colombian government were 
acknowledging the committees’ grave inadequacies. Civil society actors questioned the 
committees’ efficacy, complaining, as noted previously, that some “existed in name 
155 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2002, 40; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2005, 85. 
156 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 122; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 132. 
157 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010, 1172011; U.S. Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2011, 127. 
158 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010, 117. 
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only”—a sentiment they reiterated in subsequent years.159 And despite regular meetings 
of the interagency anti-trafficking committee “to coordinate efforts and to implement the 
national strategy to combat trafficking,” government officials freely admitted that their 
“lack of legal guidelines for the care and protection of victims remained a significant 
challenge” to combatting human trafficking in the country.160 As of the end of 2013, the 
interagency antitrafficking committee had still not completed a national strategy or 
finalized the victim protection decree that were initially drafted in 2008 (and had been 
required by law since 2005).161 In fact, the U.S. state Department reported that the 
antitrafficking committee had not produced any “tangible results” whatsoever.162 To 
make matters worse, despite the government’s evident inability to run an effective anti-
trafficking program alone, it continually shunned guidance from NGO experts in respect 
to proposed human trafficking policy—further evidence that the government’s dedication 
has been seriously limited.163  
G. FAILURE TO PROTECT CITIZENS BEFORE AND AFTER 
VICTIMIZATION 
Considering the Colombian government’s minimal efforts to address obvious 
human trafficking problems in the country, it is not surprising that the programs to 
resolve underlying issues have failed to work well. Despite a national displacement crisis, 
the Colombian government has done little to reduce the effects of this human trafficking 
factor. In 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that “after Sudan, Colombia has the 
world’s largest internal displacement crisis,” and “in the last three years alone, nearly 5 
percent of Colombia’s 43 million people has been forcibly displaced…because of the 
country’s armed conflict.”164 Displacement removes individuals and families from social 
159 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 123; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 
137. 
160 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2011, 126. 
161 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2006, 94. 
162 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 137. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Bochenek, “Colombia,” 3. 
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structures that would normally guard against human trafficking predation. It also places 
people in an economically desperate situation where they are more likely to take greater 
personal risks in order to make enough money to live better. Subsequently, in 2006, the 
Colombian government sponsored a few programs like micro-lending for women and 
anti-child labor programs intended to target vulnerable populations.165 Considering the 
imposing scope of displacement in the country and its serious effects on the human 
trafficking problem, such infrequent programs are too limited to meet Colombians’ 
needs.  
Displaced females are especially susceptible to human trafficking. Displacement 
disproportionately increases the risk of girls and women to be trafficked, in part, because 
of strong gender inequality in Colombia and the predominance of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. Sexual exploitation accounts for the largest number of human trafficking 
victims in Colombia, and females represent the vast majority of them (up to 98 percent by 
some accounts).166 Moreover, violence against females is already prevalent and tolerated 
in many areas of Colombia, which both encourages traffickers and masks instances of 
human trafficking violence. In a 2012 report, Human Rights Watch warned:  
For displaced women and girls, available evidence strongly suggests that 
the prevalence of these and other forms of gender-based violence is even 
higher: up to almost one in two displaced women, according to one survey 
conducted by USAID and Profamilia. As the country’s Constitutional 
Court concluded, patterns of violence and discrimination within 
Colombian society are “exacerbated and worsened by [displacement], 
impacting displaced women most acutely.”167 
In short, the trafficking of females in Colombia can often hide amidst existing, largely-
tolerated violence against women, and displacement aggravates the issue. 
165 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2007, 82. 
166 Hunter, Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human 
Trafficking, 17. 
167 Human Rights Watch, “Rights Out of Reach: Obstacles to Health, Justice, and Protection for 





                                                 
The government’s actions to reduce violence against women in Colombia mirror 
the advertise then neglect policies illustrated previously. According to Human Rights 
Watch, “Colombia has made important progress in constructing a legal and policy 
framework to protect women and girls from gender-based violence and to promote the 
rights to health and justice for survivors.”168 In 2008 and 2011, “the Congress passed 
some of the most comprehensive legislation on violence against women in the region 
….the Constitutional Court ordered various ministries to address gender-based violence 
against displaced women and girls,” and “the government issued regulations to 
implement the laws and court orders, and developed a comprehensive ‘referral pathway’ 
to ensure that service providers can guide victims of gender-based violence to all of the 
services available in the government’s integrated, multi-sector response to the problem—
including health services, justice, protection, and psycho-social support.”169 By all 
accounts, Colombia was positioned to start changing how its society viewed and dealt 
with violence against women. The question then became: was it working? 
Human Rights Watch asked just that. The group interviewed nearly 200 displaced 
women and girls, government officials and health care practitioners, rights advocates, 
service providers, and other civil society representatives and made two important 
discoveries. First, the organization found that “the legal framework and referral pathway, 
when properly applied, can be effective, with government officials helping displaced 
victims of gender-based violence to access justice and health services.”170 Second, the 
report revealed that “in the cases reviewed by Human Rights Watch, far more often than 
not, the framework and pathway are not properly applied, the victims do not receive the 
medical attention they are entitled to, and the perpetrators are not brought to justice.”171 
The setup was solid, even exemplar, but the implementation was simply missing. 
One reason perpetrators are not often brought to justice is directly related to this 
largely-ignored issue of overlooking violence against women. It is common for human 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid., 2. 
171 Ibid. 
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traffickers to use violence and threatened violence to control their victims, even after they 
have been “freed.” Experts have discovered that most trafficking victims experience post-
traumatic stress that usually takes months to decrease significantly under the best 
circumstances.172 In one study, the U.S. Department of State found that “76 percent of 
207 trafficked women interviewed were physically assaulted by their trafficker, pimp, 
madam, brothel and club owner, clients, or boyfriend,” and reported that “90 percent of 
victims reported being physically forced or intimidated into sex or other sexual acts, and 
91 percent of victims reported being threatened with death, beatings, increased debt, 
harm to their children and families, or re-trafficking.”173 Thus, violence and threatened 
violence haunts victims long after the physical abuse ends. 
It is not surprising then that victims fear testifying in the prosecution of their 
former traffickers. The case of a 28-year old Colombian woman typifies the fear of 
potential witnesses. “Maria” was a victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in 
Singapore but was able to escape back to Colombia; upon her return she reported the 
crime to authorities who started an investigation, and two months later she was murdered 
in her home when a vase of flowers exploded moments after a motorcyclist delivered it to 
her.174 These real and perceived threats to their safety make victims less willing to 
cooperate with authorities. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the crime, prosecution of 
cases for human trafficking relies significantly on the testimonies of victims. If these 
witnesses are unable or unwilling to assist out of fear, then a conviction is unlikely.  
One way of dealing with victims’ concerns of reprisal is through a witness 
protection program. In Colombia’s case, however, a government official admitted that 
“the country’s condition does not allow us to protect witnesses of trafficking.”175 While 
the U.S. Department of State has acknowledged that at least a handful of victims 
172 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 21. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Mónica Hurtado and Catherine Pereira-Villa, “Dynamics of Human Trafficking: The 
Colombia-East Asia Case,” Colombia Internacional 76 (2012): 169. 
175 Elaine Pearson, Human Traffic, Human Rights: Redefining Victim Protection (London: Anti-




                                                 
participated in Colombia’s witness protection program over the years, officials have also 
consistently criticized the program as “limited,” “underfunded,” and “inadequate”; most 
victims refused participation in the program and did not wish to testify against their 
traffickers because of intimidation and fear of retaliation.176 Again, this is an instance 
where more effective implementation of an existing program would have helped deter 
human trafficking in Colombia. 
The lack of a robust, effective witness protection program not only hinders known 
victims from participating in the legal system, it also encourages unknown victims to 
remain undiscovered. This phenomenon is not unique to human trafficking. In a study to 
determine the reasons why people do or do not report crime, Wesley G. Skogan found 
that “people do not report when they think nothing will happen as a result.”177 In the case 
of human trafficking, this becomes a destructive cycle that feeds on itself: victims do not 
report because of threats and a lack of safeguards, witness non-participation leads to 
fewer know instances of trafficking and lower prosecution and conviction rates among 
those that are investigated; the low percentage of traffickers punished for their crimes 
indicates to victims that nothing will come of reporting, and the traffickers continued 
liberty leaves them free to intimidate their victims—thus, the cycle continues. 
H. PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKERS IN COLOMBIA—WHAT THE 
NUMBERS REVEAL 
In spite of the prosecutorial challenges, Colombia has successfully convicted 
some human trafficking perpetrators, but the exact numbers are questionable. Table 2 
lists all of the investigations, prosecutions, and convictions the Colombian government 
reported to the U.S. Department of State since trafficking in persons reporting was 
instituted in 2001. In reviewing the reports, it is often unclear with investigations and 
prosecutions whether they are new cases started that year or a summary of ongoing cases. 
176 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2002, 40; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2003, 48; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2005, 
85; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2006, 94; U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2010, 
116; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2011, 126–27. 
177 Wesley G. Skogan, “Citizen Reporting of Crime: Some National Panel Data,” Criminology 13, 
no. 4 (1976): 549, doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1976.tb00685.x. 
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Some confusion is understandable, considering the anti-trafficking structural challenges 
and failures (including databases) this chapter highlighted earlier. 
Table 2.   The reported human trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions in Colombia between 1998 and 2013 show inconsistent 
numbers and reveal unreliable data.178 





   2002 
  
16 
2003 306 16 3 




2006 49 75 10 
2007 182 44 6 
2008 159 20 16 












The most troubling detail about Colombia’s statistics is that even the number of 
convictions is unreliable. If there is one statistic in all of human trafficking reporting that 
should be dependable, it is the number of individuals convicted of the crime. There is no 
question as to the date of conviction or the number of individuals convicted—it is not an 
estimate; it is a fact.  
Colombia, however, seems to have had trouble separating fact from fiction when 
it comes to human trafficking. From 2005 and 2010, for example, the government 
initially reported 65 convictions for human trafficking crimes, but, following an internal 
178 Data drawn from annual reports, Colombia sections in U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking 
in Persons Report.” 
 44 
                                                 
government study, later said a more accurate number was 26.179 This revised number 
aligns much better to what the United Nations found. In an effort to identify the usual 
types of actions for which individuals were being convicted of human trafficking, 
UNODC created a database and populated it with cases for which there was sufficient 
detail to consider them reliable. In the end, UNODC had compiled a list of eighteen 
Colombian prosecutions, involving 48 defendants and at least 66 victims, between 1999 
and 2012, noting that this was not likely a comprehensive list.180 A synopsis of the 
Colombian cases in the UNODC Human Trafficking Case Law Database is shown in 
Table 3. Depending on whether the 2005 dates are inclusive or exclusive and where one 
starts and stops counting, the database reveals anywhere from 27 to 31 convictions for 
human trafficking, roughly aligning with the Colombian government’s revised number 
but still different. The point is that there is no authoritative source, either within or 
outside the Colombian government, on human trafficking convictions in the country—
another failure born of neglect. 
179 Data compiled from 2006 through 2011 annual TIP reports (pages 94, 82, 95, 108, 116, and 
125 respectively) at ibid.; Vargas Trujillo, Flórez, and Mendoza Simonds, Trata de Personas En Colombia, 
46. 
180 Data taken from Colombian cases in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Human 
Trafficking Case Law Database,” accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.unodc.org/cld/index.jspx. 
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Table 3.   Colombian criminal cases in the UNODC Human Trafficking Case Law Database show a tendency to prosecute 
and convict international cases of human trafficking over domestic ones.181 
Case 
Verdict 
Year Defendants Convictions 
Plaintiffs 
/ Victims Type 
Proceso No. 14561 1999 2 2 1 International 
Proceso No. 15940 2000 2 2 4 International 
Pareja and Álvarez 2002 2 2 1 International 
González et al 2005 4 3 3 Domestic 
Morales et al 2006 5 5 10+ International 
Ruis and Giraldo 2007 2 2 11+ International 
Garcia et al 2008 7 7 4 International 
Saldarriaga et al 2008 3 3 1 International 
Gutierez and Calvo 2008 2 2 1 International 
Valencia et al 2008 4 4 2 Domestic 
Anonymous, Criminal Case No 
63–001-60-00-059-2007-00893 2008 2 2 2 Domestic 
Muñoz 2009 1 1 13+ International 
Gil 2009 1 1 3 Domestic 
M.N.A.A. 2009 1 0 1 International 
R.H.C., J.C.M. and S.C.C. 2009 3 0 4 International 
Giraldo and Cortés 2009 2 0 1 International 
Proceso No. 34728 2010 1 1 3 Domestic 
Proceso No33882 2012 4 4 1 Domestic 
Totals: 
 
48 41 66+ 
 
181 Data taken from Colombian cases in ibid. 
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I. COLOMBIA FAVORS FIGHTING THE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS 
The data available regarding convictions is quite telling about where Colombia 
chooses to focus its energies to fight human trafficking. The UNODC database exposes a 
disproportionate number of convictions for international trafficking cases in relation to 
domestic cases, especially considering their prevalence. Only six of the eighteen cases 
resulting in convictions (13 of the 66 plus victims) in UNODCs database were for 
domestic human trafficking; the remaining two-thirds were international. This is an eye-
opening revelation, considering that up to 80 percent of human trafficking in Colombia is 
domestic, so the expectation would be for a preponderance of non-international 
convictions.182 What does this apparent discrepancy say about Colombia? One thing it 
indicates is that, in cases where other countries are interested and involved, Colombia is 
more likely to take decisive action. It is all part of advertising human trafficking 
successes for obvious cases and neglecting cases outside the limelight. 
Because of the heightened outside awareness in international cases, this is one 
area in which Colombia applies consistent—if insufficient—effort. Beginning with the 
programs mentioned earlier to dissuade travelers at high risk for victimization, by 2001, 
government officials and members of NGOs had arranged to meet returning victims at 
the airport, and the Colombian government was able to offer them some limited social 
services.183 The government also reported it had instructed its consulates to provide 
victim assistance and “contracted 46 legal advisors and 16 social workers to help 
Colombian victims abroad.”184 In 2003, the U.S. Department of State reported that 
“Colombia is one of the leading countries engaged in cooperative international law 
enforcement…against traffickers,” citing “numerous international operations in 
coordination with other governments, particularly Spain, The Netherlands, and Japan, 
which have led to the freeing rescue of hundreds of trafficking victims and over 100 
182 Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 133; United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2012, 42. 
183 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2001, 18. 
184 Ibid. 
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arrests.”185 Table 4 shows the reported results of Colombia’s transnational anti-human 
trafficking efforts over the years. 
185 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2003, 48. 
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Table 4.   The number of Colombian victims freed, identified, or referred for assistance in foreign lands (listed for each 
year when specific numbers were reported) shows a continued, if inconsistent, effort to curtail the international 
human trafficking problem.186 
 
2004 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Victims Freed, 
Identified, or Referred 
for assistance 
14 9 33 22 110 106 9 38 60 
186 Numbers collected from Trafficking in Persons Reports, Colombia sections for respective reporting years, U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in 
Persons Report.” 
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As in each previous effort, however, Colombia’s international anti-trafficking 
programs have not been free from critique or neglect. For instance, consular services are 
limited to Colombian consular districts with at least 10,000 Colombian residents, making 
them unavailable to many internationally trafficked Colombians.187 Additionally, NGOs 
reported that at times “corruption of [Colombian] government officials was a problem, 
particularly in providing fraudulent travel documents,” leading to investigations but no 
convictions.188 In spite of high reporting, a 2010 government study found that “in 70 
percent of the cases of transnational trafficking registered by authorities between 2006 
and 2010, there was no information regarding the form of trafficking, calling into 
question the accuracy of this data.”189 And even the victims who were helped were 
sometimes “critical of assistance they had received from consular staff.”190 Other sources 
agreed that assistance was inadequate, as indicated in this excerpt from the 2013 
Trafficking in Persons report: 
NGOs, as well as some local officials and trafficking victims, asserted that 
government-funded victim assistance was cursory and argued that at times 
authorities put victims’ security at risk due to bureaucratic delays in the 
provision of assistance. Local governments responsible for providing 
services beyond emergency care reported that they had no dedicated 
resources to do so. Reintegration services, including employment 
assistance, were virtually nonexistent. Services for male victims were very 
limited.191 
Overall, Colombia provided a higher degree of services to prevent and restore 
internationally trafficked citizens, but only to the degree necessary to compensate for the 
higher level of international awareness such cases garnered. 
187 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2008, 95. 
188 Ibid., 94; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2006, 94. 
189 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2012, 122. 
190 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 133. 
191 Ibid., 132–33. 
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J. CONCLUSION 
The Colombian government has often initiated decent programs and policies in 
response to publicized concerns about specific human trafficking problems in the 
country; however, subsequent neglect usually sabotaged their utility. The government 
established laws that they did not enforce, hyped databases they did not populate, started 
and stopped anti-trafficking campaigns as interest waxed and waned, created committees 
that did not produce results, trained personnel who proved uninformed and ineffective, 
publicly worried about human trafficking victims but did little to help them individually, 
and largely failed to convict traffickers unless it would be too obvious if they did not. 
Overall, the Colombian government took steps to fight human trafficking only to the 
extent it became necessary to appease international opinion, allowing the trafficking in 
persons to continue largely unabated over the years. 
Successfully combating human trafficking requires significant governmental 
effort and public involvement—two things that Colombia has been unable to muster. 
Chapter IV delves into one of the possible reasons why the government has lacked the 
strength necessary to meet this challenge. 
  
 51 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 52 
IV. DRUG TRAFFICKING FACILITATES HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 
Drug trafficking in Colombia has been a major U.S. concern for many years, 
while Colombia’s human trafficking problem has passed relatively unnoticed in the 
public eye. Yet, the two are related in a number of notable ways. This chapter argues that 
drug trafficking has primed Colombia for human trafficking to flourish, thus being one of 
the most significant barriers to combatting human trafficking in the country. After 
defining the pertinent terms and describing the human trafficking marketplace in 
Colombia, this chapter will discuss each of the following mechanisms listed by which 
drug trafficking shapes the marketplace for human trafficking: drug trafficking limits the 
State’s reach and weakens its institutions, overwhelms and diverts state resources, creates 
a mold for human trafficking participation, degrades societal and familial security 
environments, and changes how individuals and societies view risky and illicit behavior.  
It is not the intent of this chapter to calculate the degree to which drug trafficking 
affects human trafficking or to recommend how to remedy the problem—those are 
subjects for further research and debate. This chapter’s purpose is to illuminate the ways 
in which the two are causally linked and set the stage for Chapter V’s discussion on how 
U.S. and Colombian policies have unintentionally facilitated human trafficking. 
A. DEFINITIONS AND NATURE OF DRUG AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
IN COLOMBIA 
Before evaluating the relationship between drug and human trafficking, one must 
first understand the terms themselves. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
defines drug trafficking as “a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, 
distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws.”192 
Colombia fits into this realm as a cultivator of opium poppy and cannabis and the world’s 
leading producer of coca, with the United States as a major market for all three.193  
192 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Drug Trafficking,” accessed December 15, 2014, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html. 
193 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: South America: Colombia.” 
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Similar to drug trafficking, human trafficking covers a variety of activities but 
involves humans as products in place of illicit substances. Exploitation of people is what 
is illegal in human trafficking, as is apparent in this definition provided by the United 
Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons: 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.194 
Of special note is that, under this definition, a person need not even leave their own home 
to be considered trafficked so long as they are being exploited through some form of 
deception or coercion described above. Moreover, in the case of a minor (under 18 years 
of age), consent is not a factor; in other words, any child who is used per the definition is 
considered trafficked.195 
While the exact extent of the human trafficking problem in Colombia (and the 
world) is unknown, there is ample evidence that it is a large problem involving all types 
of trafficking (a theme discussed in more detail in Chapter I). As a source for what some 
researchers believe to be around 70,000 annual victims, Colombia consistently ranks as 
one of the countries with highest instances of human trafficking in the Western 
Hemisphere.196 Colombian victims include men, women, and children, and many, 
especially the children, never actually leave the country. Most victims are exploited 
194 United Nations. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 32, 41. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Wells, “Rise of Human Trafficking within Colombia”; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 
in Persons Report: 2014, 134; Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5–6; 
Rao and Presenti, “Understanding Human Trafficking Origin,” 245; Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for 
Sexual Exploitation,” 199; Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 268. 
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sexually, but forced labor is not uncommon either.197 Trafficking organizations range 
from large, transnational criminal organizations down to local family units who exploit 
their own children, and the crime nearly always involves complicity of law enforcement, 
military personnel, politicians, or other state authorities.198  
B. A DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING MARKETPLACE 
It is no secret that both drug and human trafficking flourish in Colombia; their 
relationship, however, is often less apparent. The human trafficking marketplace consists 
of certain minimum requirements, without which it would cease to exist. To the extent 
that drug trafficking creates or augments these elements, it is facilitating human 
trafficking. Like any other ongoing marketplace, human trafficking requires supply, 
demand, and a medium in which to operate.  
Since people are the product in human trafficking, supply is determined by the 
availability of individuals to be trafficked. If no one were available, there would be no 
supply, and human trafficking would cease. Yet, it would be naïve to think that anyone is 
absolutely exempt from the possibility of falling prey to determined traffickers. It is more 
useful to think of supply as a range of vulnerability in which anything that raises an 
individuals’ chances of being trafficked increases the supply. Vulnerability could 
increase because the individual is less willing or able to protect themselves or because 
external protections are weakened or compromised. This chapter will illustrate how drug 
trafficking affects both vulnerability factors. 
Demand is necessary because without it there would be no benefit in supplying 
the product, so human trafficking would end. Like supply, to be useful measure, demand 
must be considered in degrees rather than as present or absent. The reasons to demand 
trafficked persons parallel the types of trafficking: sexual exploitation, forced labor or 
197 Wells, “Rise of Human Trafficking within Colombia”; Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 5–6; Amnesty International, “U.S. Policy in Colombia”; Lehti and Aromaa, 
“Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 142, 199; Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 90, 268; Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs, “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.” 
198 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 84–85; Clare M. Ribando, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. 
Policy and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL30545) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2007), 5. 
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begging, and organ harvesting (although much less frequent). In line with classic 
economic theory, demand increases as costs go down, and this chapter will explain a 
number of ways in which drug trafficking drives down the costs of human trafficking. 
The final aspect of a marketplace, the operational medium, is essential for both 
communication and the actual transaction. The buyer and seller need some way to 
communicate their desires and intentions with each other, or the marketplace fails. The 
method (verbal, written, or signaled) is not as important as the ability to send and receive 
messages reliably. They must also have access to a physical or virtual space, depending 
on the nature of the transaction, to exchange the goods or services. As with the other two 
elements, the medium can be measured along a scale, ranking the ease of communication 
and transaction. Anything that interferes would make the marketplace less viable, and 
anything that increases its reliability and freedom of operation would make the 
marketplace more viable. As this chapter explains, drug trafficking strengthens—
sometimes even creates—the communication and transaction mediums for human 
trafficking to occur. 
In sum, drug trafficking facilitates human trafficking by strengthening the 
marketplace for trafficked persons and their services. It does so by increasing victim 
vulnerability factors (more supply), lowering the costs of bringing a trafficked person to 
market (more demand), and creating spaces for buyers and sellers to communicate and 
exchange goods (more reliable medium). Absent any one of these items, the strength of 
the human trafficking marketplace in Colombia would dissipate substantially. 
C. SOME DIRECT LINKS BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 
Some links between illegal drugs and human trafficking are obvious. The jobs 
integral to cultivating, protecting, and transporting drugs creates a demand for laborers. 
Drug trafficking groups in Colombia often enlist children to fight, act as sexual slaves, or 
participate in the drug trade as cultivators, transporters, security, dealers, and even 
enforcers; such actions, whether voluntary or not, are de facto human trafficking because 
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of the minors’ legal inability to consent.199 This is one way in which drug trafficking 
increases demand for human trafficking. 
Additionally, individuals who begin as drug mules are sometimes forced into 
human trafficking (usually women for sex).200 This is possible because participating in 
drug running—an illegal act—significantly heightens the individual’s vulnerability to 
trafficking, as she has already entered the criminal marketplace, a fact that human 
traffickers can leverage to their benefit. Finally, human traffickers frequently use drugs to 
entrap and control victims for sexual exploitation, increasing their vulnerability through 
addiction.201 The increased vulnerability as a result of drug trafficking in these instances 
increases the supply aspect of human trafficking. 
D. DRUG TRAFFICKING LIMITS THE STATE’S REACH AND WEAKENS 
ITS INSTITUTIONS 
More pervasive than the obvious links are the indirect causal links between drug 
trafficking and human trafficking in Colombia. Drug trafficking has weakened or 
compromised state institutions, allowing human trafficking to flourish. In many regions 
of Colombia armed groups involved with drug trafficking “substitute for the state, 
imposing a very authoritarian regime, defining and applying their own laws and 
regulations, and providing education, police, and civil justice to solve conflicts among the 
population.”202 In effect, drug trafficking has created safe havens (the communication 
199 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 71, 269; U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons 
Report: 2008, 94. 
200 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 90–91, 220, 255–56; International Organization for 
Migration, “Straddling the Border: Drug Mules and Human Trafficking,” Global Eye on Human 
Trafficking, no. 5, 2009, 1, 
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/projects/showcase_pdf/global_e
ye_fifth_issue.pdf; Lehti and Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” 197. 
201 Ribando, Trafficking in Persons, 5; Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 123, 128–29, 241–42, 
247. 
202 Francisco E. Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social 
Crisis,” in The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International System, ed. 
Menno Vellinga (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004), 73. 
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and transaction mediums), wherein criminals such as human traffickers can operate with 
relative impunity.203  
Being able to operate freely in a criminal enterprise also affects the other two 
elements of the human trafficking market. Less external oversight means fewer 
protections for potential victims, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. It also 
means lower costs for those who wish to benefit from the exploitation, greatly increasing 
demand. Perpetrators are encouraged to continue operations because they are making a 
profit and operating in a space with little chance of law enforcement disrupting their 
activities. Moreover, other beneficiaries, such as men who desire to have sex with 
minors, are much more willing to participate when the chances of getting caught are low. 
Not only has drug trafficking pushed the legitimate state out of certain spaces, it 
has also infiltrated and weakened areas the state purportedly still controls. Drug 
traffickers have developed an extensive subversive network within Colombia, causing 
people to distrust the government and disassociate themselves from the state and making 
authorities “impotent and incapable of defeating contraband.”204 Such impotence stems 
from the wide array of actors involved in the illegal drug industry, including guerrillas; 
paramilitaries; peasants; army members; public employees; politicians; police; and other 
professionals such as chemists, pilots, lawyers, and bankers.205 With so many 
“legitimate” citizens involved in organized crime, it is not surprising that human 
trafficking has become just one more overlooked problem. 
Even when human trafficking victims are discovered, they seldom testify against 
their abusers because of a legitimate fear of personal or family retaliation, distrust of 
police and legal systems, and inadequate state protections to overcome those barriers—all 
of which are partially attributable to the drug war. With low chances of losing their 
203 Bilal Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative 
Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 
457, doi:10.1080/10576100902892570. 
204 Quote by Fanny Kertzman, director of Customs Control in Colombia in Nazih Richani, 
Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press, 2002), 100; Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in Colombia,” 141. 
205 Richani, Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, 100; Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in 
Colombia,” 76. 
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human products or getting caught and convicted, human traffickers are free to publicly 
and privately exploit their victims again and again.206 Hence, it is not surprising that 
trafficking in people now generates more money for organized crime than anything 
besides trafficking in drugs and arms.207 
E. DRUG TRAFFICKING OVERWHELMS AND DIVERTS STATE 
RESOURCES 
While the existence of drug trafficking supports human trafficking, strong 
antidrug policies tend to exacerbate the human trafficking problem. Domestic and 
international hardline policies against the drug trade have caused what state resources are 
available to be diverted, in large part, to anti-drug activities, simultaneously making drug 
trafficking more costly and human trafficking less so. Chapter V discusses this dynamic 
in much more detail. Thus, for basic economic reasons, policymakers and enforcers are 
inadvertently encouraging drug traffickers to diversify into human trafficking operations. 
In retrospect, the evidence is painfully obvious. For example, prisons throughout the 
world are filled with convicts doing time for drug offenses while containing 
conspicuously few people convicted of human trafficking; such striking empirical 
evidence has not gone unnoticed by drug traffickers.208  
In Colombia, the human trafficking problem is eclipsed by conflicts between state 
actors, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, and insurgents. Human trafficking is 
inherently difficult to recognize, since it “does not often contribute to greater rates of 
visible violence or upheaval,” and because victims almost never self-identify.209 
Consequently, it is easy for governments and societies to allow other problems to 
overshadow interest in human trafficking issues, which lowers the perpetrators’ and 
beneficiaries’ costs because they are less likely to get caught doing business. Chapter V 
further elaborates on how anti-drug policies affect human trafficking. 
206 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 224; R. E. Bell, “Sex Trafficking: A Financial Crime 
Perspective,” Journal of Financial Crime 9, no. 2 (2001): 168. 
207 Bell, “Sex Trafficking,” 168. 
208 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 88. 
209 Ibid., 79. 
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F. DRUG TRAFFICKING CREATES A MOLD FOR HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING PARTICIPATION 
In addition to financial and other incentives for drug traffickers to diversify into 
human trafficking, their experience makes the transition relatively smooth and effective. 
Preexisting trafficking corridors, contacts, skills, and techniques are often easily 
transferrable between the two illicit activities. Author R. E. Bell explained:  
Organised crime groups, used to trafficking in other commodities such as 
drugs and arms, have identified an opportunity to use their infrastructures 
to trade in another market. A senior Belgian police officer has commented: 
“It’s the same organisations, same money-laundering systems, same safe 
houses, same personnel—just a different commodity.” An attractive 
feature from the traffickers’ perspective is that the initial investment of 
working capital required for trafficking in women will often be less than 
that required for drug trafficking. Profits obtained from trafficking in 
women can then be used to finance other criminal activity. As with their 
dealings in other criminal markets, organized crime groups may use 
bribery and corruption of police or other officials to facilitate their 
trafficking.210 
In this sense, Colombia matches the global pattern in that human trafficking has been 
experiencing significant growth in areas where drug crime networks are well established, 
with a significant amount of evidence showing the two often operate simultaneously in 
criminal organizations.211 In addition to Bell’s example above, Louise Shelley helps 
explain the overlap, noting that “becoming a human trafficker requires the acquisition of 
certain skills,” including “recruitment, transportation, procurement of false documents, 
marketing, and money laundering”—all of which can be gleaned from the drug trade.212 
She further observes that “the areas where drug crime networks are well established are 
increasingly important growth areas for human trafficking” throughout the world.213  
Bilay Y. Saab and Alexandra W. Taylor use a related argument to explain how 
different relationships with the drug trade influenced later criminal activities in the FARC 
210 Bell, “Sex Trafficking,” 167. 
211 Ibid.; Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 456; Shelley, Human Trafficking, 
2010, 44, 88–89, 121, 167, 256, 268, 285–87. 
212 Shelley, Human Trafficking, 2010, 89–90. 
213 Ibid., 88. 
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and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Saab and Taylor outline the FARC’s 
relationship with the drug trade as a peripheral one because its leadership wished to 
maintain an aura of political legitimacy, whereas the AUC had no such limitations and 
maintained “in house” drug capabilities.214 The authors’ make the point that the FARC’s 
decision not to embed themselves directly in the drug trade initially denied the 
organization certain skills: “Armed insurgents who have not traditionally participated in 
drug production, trafficking, and money laundering may find it difficult to quickly 
acquire the necessary skills and networks and may instead turn to criminal partners to 
carry out these activities.”215 The reverse was also true—AUC members (now known as 
Bandas Criminales Emergentes or BACRIMs following the AUC’s official 
demobilization) had acquired the skills and networks, which helps explain their 
diversification into other criminal activities, including human trafficking.216 In sum, drug 
traffickers are more and more often drawn to human trafficking as a low-risk, high-profit 
investment in their criminal portfolio that they feel comfortable adding because of its 
synergistic overlaps with the drug trade. 
G. DRUG TRAFFICKING DEGRADES SOCIETAL AND FAMILIAL 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS 
Through widespread violence and human displacement, drug trafficking further 
destabilizes the Colombian security environment, fertilizing the soil from whence human 
trafficking springs. The drug conflict did not initiate the Colombian displacement crisis 
(peasants have been forced off their lands at least since the 1950s), nor is it the sole 
contributor today, but drug trafficking and antidrug measures have certainly perpetuated 
and enhanced Colombia’s displacement problems.217 According to the United Nations 
Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, displaced individuals “are 
214 Saab and Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups,” 456. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid., 456–57. 
217 Harvey F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tuscaloosa, 
AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2001), 23; Marc W. Chernick, “Colombia: Does Injustice Cause 
Violence?,” in What Justice? Whose Justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin America, ed. Susan Eva 
Eckstein and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 186. 
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disproportionately affected by unemployment, discrimination and lack of access to 
training opportunities to enter the labour market; they are therefore among the 
groups…most vulnerable to human trafficking.”218 With some 300,000 new internally 
displaced persons each year as a result of conflict between government and illegal armed 
groups and drug traffickers, nearly six million Colombians now fall into this vulnerable 
category.219 Making matters worse, Colombian support for both displaced persons and 
victims of human trafficking is woefully inadequate—likely for the same reason: the 
ongoing conflict consumes state capacity, leaving too little attention and resources to 
provide the requisite victim assistance.220  
Displaced individuals are more vulnerable to trafficking not only because they 
have been forced away from homes, jobs, and social support structures, but also because 
there is often a fundamental shift in the constitution of their own family. Many displaced 
personnel have lost a head of household as the men are initially killed or are lost to the 
family through emotional isolation or overconsumption of alcohol; the women are left to 
fend for themselves and frequently turn to prostitution as the only available resource for 
the immediate survival of their families.221 Entering prostitution places women at 
exceptionally high-risk for succumbing to human trafficking, becoming one of the 
estimated 400,000 to 2,500,000 victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation in 
the Americas.222 Hence, even where drug trafficking does not affect human trafficking 
directly, its ever-present effects of violence and displacement greatly enhance the 
vulnerability of many Colombians, increasing the marketplace’s supply. 
218 Hunter, Human Trafficking and Business: Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human 
Trafficking, 41; Mauricio Reina, “Drug Trafficking and the National Economy,” in Violence in Colombia 
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Sánchez (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 94. 
219 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2013, 131; Central Intelligence 
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H. DRUG TRAFFICKING CHANGES HOW INDIVIDUALS AND 
SOCIETIES VIEW RISKY AND ILLICIT BEHAVIOR 
The drug trade has also adversely affected the economy, making it difficult for 
many Colombians, not just those who have been displaced, to live well. The money flow 
from drugs has, among other things, forced monetary policy (e.g., revaluation of the 
peso), distorted national markets, and weakened the viability of legal businesses—all 
without providing productive links to the economy aside from increased construction in 
some areas.223 The end result is a more expensive country to live in, with nonparticipants 
in the drug trade hurting the most. Some citizens see the vast disparity in wealth between 
them and those who are rich and decide to try and improve their economic situation 
through prostitution or questionable work offers domestically and internationally—
actions that increase vulnerability and often lead to human trafficking.224 
Over time, illicit activity in Colombia, particularly the drug trade, has skewed the 
Colombian perception of how to deal with criminal activities, including human 
trafficking. Francisco E. Thoumi notes that Colombians have historically “learned to live 
in an environment with many organizations that today would be considered criminal,” but 
“were accepted as normal and justified because of poverty, inequality, social exclusion 
and other reasons or accepted as part of modernization.”225 The institutional crisis in 
Colombia characterized by drug trade violence and corruption has led to a society in 
which most people care only about themselves or immediate family and are less able or 
interested to care about the plight of others, resulting in an apathy toward human 
trafficking offenses even when observed.226 Such individual disinterest has culminated in 
an entire society that devalues human rights, if not in policy certainly in practice.227  
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Colombian desensitization stems in large part from a sense of resignation toward 
the inevitable. Luis Alberto Restrepo M., a philosopher at the National University in 
Bogotá, explained:  
The majority of the Colombian population has become accustomed to 
viewing human rights violations as endemic occurrences or as natural 
disasters, as normal as landslides or earthquakes. By way of excusing 
Colombians, this insensitivity stems in good measure from the impotence 
of citizens isolated by an all-powerful, generalized, and out-of-control 
violence…Who knows since when—perhaps since the beginning—
Colombian society has been in the habit of accepting with a certain 
resignation the terrible crimes of humanity. If one keeps in mind that 
respect for human rights is the fundamental premise of all ethics and 
judicial order, one must necessarily conclude that this premise is 
extremely weak and fragile in the minds of the Colombian people.228 
Any individual or state capacity or will that might be left to combat human trafficking 
has been degraded by drug traffickers infiltrating, corrupting, and attacking the political 
and legal systems in Colombia to the point that it is unlikely they can function properly to 
investigate, prosecute, or convict the traffickers.229 Consequently, the drug trade has 
weakened the expected societal check against illegality in Colombia, increasing the 
vulnerability of many to human trafficking, inspiring others to perpetrate, and 
encouraging others to partake. All the while, reminding the general populace that they 
have bigger problems and it is none of their business anyway. Through the mechanism of 
altered perception of illegality, drug trafficking affects supply, demand, and medium for 
operation in a way advantageous to the trafficking of humans. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Drug trafficking increases the factors that make people more susceptible to human 
trafficking, prospective culprits more likely to engage in human trafficking, and society 
and the state less able and willing to deal with the problem. Drug trafficking in Colombia 
and the fight against it has allowed non-state entities to control entire sections of the 
228 Ibid., 96. 
229 Ron Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe: Taking Down Colombia’s Cali Drug Cartel 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 253; Restrepo, “The Pursuit of Efficiency and the Colombian 
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country and compromised much of the remaining state capacity elsewhere in terms of 
dealing with human trafficking. Additionally, through their normal course of operations, 
drug traffickers have developed practices and contacts that also work well for human 
trafficking operations, easing and encouraging transition between the two activities as 
authorities fight against drug trafficking. Finally, the persistence of drug trafficking and 
its accompanying violence and human displacement have made individuals less risk-
adverse in their personal lives and society more crime-tolerant in general. Through these 
mechanisms, drug trafficking has strengthened the marketplace for human trafficking, 
which is why drug trafficking is one of the biggest barriers to controlling the human 
trafficking problem in Colombia. 
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V. U.S. POLICIES HAVE AGGRAVATED THE HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING PROBLEM 
In December of 1823, President James Monroe delivered a message to Congress 
that became known as the Monroe Doctrine, expressing a renewed U.S. interest in the 
Western Hemisphere and declaring it off-limits to European colonization.230 This U.S.-
knows-best approach toward Latin America has led to a number of unintended and 
undesirable outcomes. In Colombia, strong U.S. anticommunist and antidrug policies 
have precipitated violence and weakened the government’s capacity to govern, thus 
facilitating criminal activity including the trafficking of persons in the country. 
Chapter IV described the links between drug trafficking and human trafficking; 
this chapter takes the causal chain one step back, illuminating the significant links 
between U.S. policy and the evolution of those factors that facilitate human trafficking. 
U.S.-sponsored anticommunist activities, antidrug efforts, and violence in Latin America 
are rather well studied subjects, but the human trafficking link is less so. There is ample 
evidence that the United States played out its Cold War policies in the region, including 
armed support of groups willing to fight against communism.231 Researchers have 
written prolifically about the drug trade and interactions between U.S. policy and the 
Colombian government, to include the links between drug policy and increased internal 
conflict, revolving primarily around insurgent groups, paramilitaries, and the armed 
forces.232 A number of authors have even described how these hardline policies have had 
a destabilizing influence in the region.233 Of all that has been written, however, the 
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particular effect of U.S.-sponsored policies on the persistence of violence and corruption 
and its link to human trafficking in Colombia is a little discussed theme—one which this 
chapter will elucidate.  
Like in a three-act play, the United States performed a role in Colombia, 
portraying a character who believed he was doing the right things but failed to honestly 
reflect on the effects of his actions on those around him. This chapter sets the stage by 
examining the relationship between the Colombian state and organized crime. Act 1 
introduces the United States as a post-World War II policymaker in Latin America. In 
Act 2, drugs take center stage as the United States tries to ban them from the 
neighborhood but they refuse to leave. Act 3 shows the United States rounding up his 
neighbors in an all-out war against drugs, with violent results. Finally, the chapter 
presents the moral of the story, observing how oppressive U.S. policies affected 
Colombian society and the nature of organized crime, unintentionally allowing human 
trafficking to prosper. 
A. SETTING THE STAGE: THE STATE AS A DETERMINANT OF 
CRIMINALITY 
Bruce Bagley has written: “States determine the form or type of organized crime 
that can operate and flourish within a given national territory.”234 Since colonization, 
domestic factors have allowed economic crime to be a mainstay in the area now known 
as Colombia.235 After gaining independence from Spain and splitting from Ecuador and 
Venezuela in the first half of the nineteenth century, Colombia has suffered one civil war 
after another.236 Moving into the twentieth century, a weak central government that is 
unable to exert influence over all of the country, coupled with constant violence and 
economic protectionist policies like extremely high tariffs, have facilitated the spread of 
234 Bruce Bagley, “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 
Twenty-First Century,” Woodrow Wilson Center Update on the Americas (August 2012), 11, 
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criminal gangs specializing in illegal emerald mining and exporting, a small arms black 
market, and many small-scale domestic crimes.237 
Colombia’s geography also curtailed effective state control, facilitating organized 
crime. Francisco E. Thoumi attributes some of the country’s inability to maintain law and 
order to the difficulties imposed by terrain:  
Very high mountain ranges and thick unhealthy tropical forests have made 
integration very costly and difficult. This promoted the development of 
strong local identities and a very weak national identity. Indeed, it may be 
asserted that Colombia is a country but not a nation in the sense of having 
an identity that generates cohesion among its members. Colombia is a 
country with very low levels of trust, solidarity, reciprocity, and 
empathy.238 
In such an environment, Thoumi notes, organized crime was usually a local issue that 
was often “accepted as normal and justified because of poverty, inequality, social 
exclusion, and other reasons or accepted as part of modernization.”239 As the violence 
continued unabated in the 1940s and 1950s, guerrilla organizations with liberal or 
conservative ideologies, including the FARC, appeared in opposition to the state, but 
their main goal was often to capture land and displace opponents.240 In sum, domestic 
instability and the lack of a strong central government caused Colombian policies to 
focus on survival, leaving little room to worry about crime that did not explicitly threaten 
the state. 
Thus, the Colombian state was already poorly positioned to deal with crimes 
against individuals such as human trafficking. State reach was limited, leaving rural 
populations vulnerable, and geographic barriers had inhibited the formation of a unified 
national or social identity that would have helped eschew human rights violations, like 
trafficking in persons, among its citizenry. Such a weakened state also left the country 






                                                 
B. ACT 1: U.S. POLICY TRANSITIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 
The end of World War II and beginning of the Cold War marked a transition in 
how the United States viewed and interacted with Latin America. Historian George C. 
Herring noted that, in the late 1940s, the United States was turning away from its earlier 
Good Neighbor policies in Latin America and toward “active involvement centered 
around anti-communism.”241 One prominent example of this was an anti-communism 
resolution the United States sponsored at the creation of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) in 1948, ensuring that the OAS’s charge “to enforce regional security” had 
a particular Cold War flavor.242 
U.S.-inspired anti-communist sentiments gave conservative political leaders in 
Colombia the excuse they needed to try and exterminate left-aligned parties. Marc W. 
Chernick explained that the push to exclude communists led Colombian National Front 
leaders to aggressively and violently attack the major Liberal-Communist self-defense 
communities, including bombing campaigns beginning in the mid-1960s.243 According to 
Chernick, this policy of exclusion and elimination proved to be a serious mistake, 
converting “what had been armed self-defense communities into a mobile guerrilla 
force.”244 He described one particularly inciting incident: 
The 1964 bombing of the first community, Marquetalia (in Tolima), 
became part of the iconography of the subsequent guerrilla insurgency. 
According to Manuel Marulanda Velez, then military leader of the self-
defense communities, he and a small fighting force withstood the 
onslaught of a combined force of sixteen thousand troops from the 
Colombian Army and Air Force (Marulanda 1973: 79–80). Marulanda 
escaped the assault and went on to found a more modern guerrilla force, 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia; FARC).245 
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The United States was happy to help Colombia in its fight against Communism—after 
all, it was a conflict the United States instigated that aligned neatly with U.S. Cold War 
ideology.246 As the turn toward violence indicates, during this time, human rights 
concerns were not paramount in Colombia for either government. If extrajudicial killing 
could be tolerated and even condoned, then less-egregious matters, including trafficking 
in persons, were unlikely to make their way onto the national agenda. 
C. ACT 2: THE U.S. PUSH TO CRIMINALIZE THE DRUG TRADE 
The story of U.S. influence in Latin America continued with burgeoning interest 
in the drug trade. The Mexican drug trade began as a legitimate industry centered on the 
political elite that only became criminal when U.S. pressure drove Mexico to prohibit it. 
To Mexican elites like Colonel Esteban Cantu, Governor of Baja California (1914-1920), 
the drug trade was just another aspect of business that they could conduct with more 
control and impunity than others.247 At first opium poppy was cultivated and imported 
for medical use, and consumption was not a big concern in Mexico; the United States, on 
the other hand, had developed a prohibitionist mentality toward it.248 The United States 
imposed its will on Mexico insomuch that, following the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914 
that regulated opium production, Mexico prohibited marijuana and opium poppy 
cultivation and marketing in 1920 and 1926 respectively.249 Nevertheless, demand did 
not diminish, and smugglers took advantage of the profits to be made in the freshly 
criminalized trade.250 
Once the drug trade became illegal, the political elite continued to run the various 
enterprises with little trouble from those charged to enforce anti-drug laws. One author, 
Luis Astorga, noted that governors, political protégés, members of police agencies, and 
246 Ibid. 
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the like used traffickers to “do their dirty work” and did not worry about “moral 
considerations and the illegal nature of the activities.”251 All the while, Department of 
Health agents who were charged with enforcing the antidrug policy in Mexico were 
complicit in the drug trade. There were too few of them to cover the vast Mexican 
territory. Worse yet, as Astorga points out, for a time “the agents were paid with the 
drugs they seized, which, of course, they then sold,” perpetuating the problem.252 After 
the United States stepped up their anti-drug efforts in the post-World War II era, the drug 
enforcement responsibility shifted to the Mexican Army who continued with the tradition 
of protecting important political families, shifting blame to “traffickers, police agents, 
commanders, and other low-level officials.”253 Hence, the drug trade in Mexico began as 
a top-down business model with the elites running the show and minimal trouble from 
anti-drug laws and their enforcers. 
Colombia also joined the drug trade, and business grew rapidly. Beginning with 
marijuana then quickly moving to cocaine, organized crime groups realized huge profits 
in the illicit market.254 As the country became more connected with the outside world, 
organized crime took on a transnational aspect and Colombia became a leading player in 
the global cocaine business.255 Criminal elements “included many independent 
operators,” but also “two loosely organized large syndicates…based in Medellin and 
Cali,” and “other significant trafficking groups…in Bogotá and the Caribbean coast.”256 
This was the beginning of what became known as drug cartels.257 Both Mexico and 
Colombia housed large drug trafficking enterprises that, while illicit, operated relatively 
freely and peacefully at first. Under these circumstances, the drug trade did not 
significantly affect the state of human trafficking within Colombia. Yet, all that was 
about to change. 
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D. ACT 3: THE U.S. WAR ON DRUGS 
Peace did not last long, as the United States pushed the countries to actively 
combat the trade in drugs. U.S. government-sponsored efforts may have even created the 
need for a response in Colombia. By pushing a significant amount of marijuana 
cultivation out of Mexico and then coca out of Peru and Bolivia, U.S.-led drug 
eradication programs simply transferred drug production to Colombia.258 To put this in 
context, in 1985, “Peru produced roughly 65% of the world’s supply of coca leaf while 
Bolivia grew approximately 25% and Colombia 10% or less,” but “by 2000, Colombia 
cultivated an estimated 90% of the world’s coca leaf while production in Peru and 
Bolivia dwindled to historic lows.”259 Still, the Colombian government did not view the 
increasing domestic drug cultivation or even its accompanying organized crime as a 
serious danger—it was seen as a U.S. and European consumer problem; U.S. 
policymakers, on the other hand, viewed drugs as a direct security threat against which 
they declared all-out war.260 In spite of anti-trafficking efforts, a persistent global 
demand for drugs provided a strong economic incentive for enterprising criminals to 
produce them and share in the estimated $150 billion annually from drug sales in the 
United States alone.261  
A lack of political and individual will further hampered drug reform efforts in 
Colombia. Many of the individuals who were in positions to act against the drug trade 
were also either using drugs or profiting from the illicit practice; hence, they were 
complicit in its continuation.262 Even the military, which began antidrug efforts in the 
258 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 21; Peceny and Durnan, “The 
FARC’s Best Friend,” 102–103, 106; Bruce Bagley, “The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized 
Crime in Latin America,” Sociologia, Problemas E Práticas, no. 71 (March 1, 2013): 107. 
259 Bagley, “Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin America,” 102. 
260 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 21, 23; Chepesiuk, The Bullet or 
the Bribe, 261; Thoumi, “Colombian Organized Crime,” 138. 
261 Bagley, “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas,” 1–2. 
262 Álvaro Camacho Guizado and Andrés López Restrepo, “From Smugglers to Drug Lords to 
Traquetos: Changes in the Colombian Illicit Drug Organizations,” in Peace, Democracy, and Human 
Rights in Colombia, ed. Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame, 2007), 64, 78. 
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1980s was sometimes directly paid off by drug traffickers and preferred to spend the 
millions of dollars in U.S. aid earmarked for fighting drugs to fight guerrillas instead.263  
The Colombian government came to see drug trafficking as a danger to 
democracy only once “drug groups became so powerful that any politician, judge, or 
journalist opposing them was either bought off or killed.”264 That said, the traffickers did 
not resort to violent, subversive methods until after the state started fighting them openly. 
Generally, the harder the government pushed against organized crime, the more 
ingrained the criminals became in politics and society. In response to an extradition treaty 
with the United States in 1978, for example, traffickers built stronger links within the 
political system ranging from paying off politicians to direct attempts by Pablo Escobar, a 
notorious Colombian drug lord, to get elected to Congress.265 Both the cartels and 
paramilitary organizations developed links within the military, police forces, economic 
elites, and politicians (to include at least one Colombian president).266 Some guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups even took over control of entire rural municipalities, siphoning off 
the federal funds, running the illicit drug trade largely unencumbered, investing in 
legitimate businesses to “complement their income and launder some of their illicit 
profits,” and inducing voters to “elect the candidates they supported in order to obtain 
revenues from municipal investment projects and employees including those in education 
and in the health sector.”267 It was like trying to get free from Chinese handcuffs by 
tugging harder and harder—a losing strategy. 
U.S. hardline antidrug policies infected Colombia, throwing the country’s drug 
trade into a spiral of violence. During 1983 and 1984, the Betancur administration, 
largely influenced by Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, ramped up antidrug efforts 
with direct attacks on drug centers and personnel, to which the drug traffickers responded 
263 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 15–16. 
264 Ibid., 21. 
265 Thoumi, “Colombian Organized Crime,” 137–38. 
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by assassinating Minister Lara, causing the administration to counterattack even more 
forcibly.268 By the end of 1984, the government had “seized 2,851,000 kilograms of 
marijuana and 23,931 kilograms of cocaine, destroyed 268 cocaine-processing 
laboratories, and arrested 2,773 individuals.”269 The tit-for-tat of violence escalated in 
late 1986 when assassins killed a prominent newspaper editor and longtime critic of the 
drug trade, prompting the Barco government to issue a self-proclaimed “‘offensive 
without precedent’” against the drug trade,” to which the narcotraffickers responded by 
increasing assassinations, killing fifty-seven judges and twenty-four journalists in 1987 
alone.270 The attack-assassination-retaliation cycle continued, culminating in a U.S.-
backed, all-out war against the Medellín cartel that eventually killed its leader and 
shattered the organization.271  
Strong anti-drug policies, headed by the United States, caused both drug and 
human trafficking problems to grow. Eradication efforts in neighboring countries moved 
more production into Colombia, fighting the trade enhanced political corruption, and 
campaigns to eliminate trafficking organizations increased internal violence in the 
country. All of these factors—more drug trafficking, worse corruption, and more 
violence—fueled the human trafficking enterprise as illustrated in Chapter IV. Moreover, 
the drug trade persisted. 
E. MORAL OF THE STORY: HARDLINE POLICIES DID MORE HARM 
THAN GOOD 
Dissolving the cartels did not eliminate the drug trade as hoped; conversely, it 
diversified and multiplied the groups involved. Anti-cartel efforts, including killing Pablo 
Escobar, head of the Medellín cartel, in 1993 and offering plea bargains to the heads of 
the Cali cartel in 1994–95 effectively disbanded the two most prominent drug trafficking 
organizations in Colombia. As the drug trade fragmented, some 300 new, smaller 
organizations, including insurgent and paramilitary groups, entered the mix. The FARC 
268 Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 24. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid., 45–46. 
271 Ibid., 46–50. 
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also stepped into the vacuum and became a prominent player. Participating in the drug 
trade increased the FARC’s military power but decreased its popular support as the 
organization’s ideology became infiltrated with drug economics, politics, and 
practices.272 Consequently, while the cartel-led drug trade had originally been relatively 
controlled and nonviolent, government action against it was a catalyst that resulted in 
even worse problems for the state, while still looking like a political victory for the U.S.-
Colombian war on drugs. 
Along with devolving drug trafficking governance to a plethora of smaller groups, 
the breakup of the cartels caused drug traffickers to diversify their economic interests, 
including into direct participation in human trafficking. As Chapter IV illustrated, this 
new generation of drug traffickers in Colombia was well motivated to participate in 
human trafficking activities. The new organizations were more flexible and prone to 
violence, and many quickly realized that “their skills could be profitable in other criminal 
activities: selling ‘protection’ to businesses (extortion), assaults, kidnappings, 
prostitution, gambling, retail drug sales in local markets, etc.”273 One of their top 
concerns was to avoid overly intense government interest, and the new drug groups were 
better suited to such a purpose. The government did not view them as a direct threat to 
the state in the same way it had the cartels, and the new organizations learned and 
adapted, operating primarily at the municipal and departmental, rather than national 
levels, and becoming more subtle in their political alliances.274 
These drug war “victories,” coupled with state-led decentralization, exacerbated 
the devolution of state control to paramilitary and insurgent groups in many areas of 
Colombia and partially transformed political and ideological groups such as the FARC 
272 Bagley, “Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin America,” 102–103, 
107; Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 186; Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, 
Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 346, 357, 360–
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Archive of “Raúl Reyes” (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 222–23; Saab and 
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and ELN into more economically motivated criminal enterprises.275 Writing on the 
destabilizing influence of decentralization on the Colombian state, Kent Eaton 
emphasizes how antidrug policies facilitated the phenomenon: “The inability of the 
police to monitor how illicit armed groups were abusing decentralization has a number of 
causes, including the U.S.-funded war on drugs that re-oriented police work in the 1990s 
to focus overwhelmingly on narco-trafficking.”276 As authorities fixated more and more 
on drugs, the attention they could spare for other criminal conduct—namely human 
trafficking. 
Attacking cartels also inadvertently revitalized the Colombian insurgency. Mark 
Peceny and Michael Durnan described how antidrug policies enriched warring factions 
(particularly the FARC): 
The destruction of the Colombian drug cartels, however, dismantled the 
most powerful military opponents of the FARC in many regions and 
decreased the ability of drug-trafficking operations to resist paying taxes 
to the FARC as part of the price of doing business. The successful 
interdiction of coca being flown from Peru, combined with the disruption 
of the drug cartels’ transnational supply networks, increasingly pushed 
coca cultivation into the areas of Colombia where the FARC had long had 
a significant presence. This shift in production provided the FARC with 
unprecedented opportunities to tax the drug trade. Meanwhile, aerial 
fumigation may have deepened Colombian coca workers’ support for the 
FARC against a government that was threatening their health and 
livelihood. All of these unintended consequences of successful U.S. 
antidrug policies worked together to provide the FARC with 
unprecedented opportunities to strengthen its decadeslong insurgency 
against the Colombian state during the 1990s.277 
Ultimately, stronger antidrug policies in Colombia have led to more criminal entities, 
increased drug-related violence, and an influx of wealth to insurgent movements and 
other armed, non-state actors. 
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Thoumi points out that proponents of the hardline stance against drugs argue that 
the nearly $8 billion the United States gave Colombia under Plan Colombia to fight drug 
production and trafficking since 2001 helped “beat back the FARC guerrillas, demobilize 
many—but not all—of the country’s paramilitary bands, and substantially reduce the 
country’s astronomically high levels of drug-related violence”; yet, “as of 2010 Colombia 
remained a principal source of coca leaf and refined cocaine in the Andes, and drug-
related violence and criminality appeared to be once again on the rise,” particularly due 
to the high number of small drug gangs vying for territory and supremacy and without 
any governing force.278 
The fight against organized crime in Colombia has fed, rather than suppressed its 
contributing factors. The high levels of violence over many years now has displaced 
many Colombians and accustomed them to its prevalence and convinced them of the 
inability of the state to protect them; consequently, they do not consider themselves part 
of a shared nationality, distrust the central government, and are more likely to become 
involved with organized crime.279 All of these tie-ins with the legitimate workings of the 
state have occurred despite (and in some cases because of) the country’s hardline anti-
drug stance, and they all subsequently facilitate human trafficking.280  
While more oppressive government strategies have resulted in criminal 
organization evolution, not eradication, more tolerant or cooperative strategies have 
occasionally succeeded in reducing violence, if not the amount of organized crime. For 
instance, the mayor of Medellín significantly lowered the rate of violence in the city for a 
time using a collaborative strategy of “informal negotiations with the gangs as new 
mayoral initiatives to reduce gang violence (e.g., increased social services, expanded 
educational opportunities, jobs programs, and new public recreational spaces for 
youth).”281 Again, this illustrates the direct link between level of violence and measure of 
278 Bagley, “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas,” 5, 9; Thoumi, “Colombian 
Organized Crime,” 140. 
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force inherent in antidrug policies, and as Chapter IV illustrated, increased violence in 
Colombia is one of the primary factors precipitating human trafficking in the country. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlined U.S. and Colombian policies intended to crush communism 
and drugs, highlighting the strategies’ tragic effects—a case of the medicine being worse 
than the disease. U.S.-led anti-communist efforts effectively created the FARC—the 
oldest insurgent movement in the world. And, while Colombia has never been free of 
organized crime, it enjoyed relatively low levels of drug-related violence until U.S. anti-
drug efforts induced the country to take oppressive action against large, organized crime 
groups. Such hardline policies have not succeeded in eliminating the drug problem; 
rather, they have splintered large drug trafficking groups, leaving openings for outside 
contenders, including greater participation by insurgent groups.  
In the interest of avoiding further reprisals, most of these new groups operated on 
a smaller scale and diversified their criminal activities, with many participating in human 
trafficking as a low-risk, high-profit venture, as Chapter IV clearly detailed. Moreover, 
the drug conflict in Colombia fed long-term violence, widespread displacement, 
economic hardship, deep-seated corruption of public officials, and a general 
desensitization toward illicit activity in the country—all of which are factors that 
contribute to human trafficking. Drug trafficking and the fight against it strengthened 
incentives for individuals to participate in human trafficking and provided them with the 
skills, networks, and spaces necessary to make it profitable while, simultaneously, 
enlarging the pool of potential victims and reducing the chances of getting caught or 
punished. 
The most success drug eradication efforts have achieved to-date is to shift 
cultivation and trafficking from one place to another, but the cost, in both money and 
blood, has been terrible. In light of this evidence, perhaps hardline U.S. anti-drug activists 
should take a moment to review the unintended negative consequences of their imposed 
oppressive strategies, or as Winston Churchill once said: “However beautiful the strategy, 
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you should occasionally look at the results.”282 After all, as the Mexican case showed, 
such an outcome is not unique to Colombia—it may be unintended, but cannot be 
considered unanticipated anymore. 
282 BrainyQuote, “Winston Churchill Quotes,” accessed September 22, 2014, 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND WAY AHEAD 
From the beginning, the U.S. Department of State applauded Colombia’s 
conformity with all of the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. 
Colombia signed and ratified all of the appropriate treaties and enacted the laws 
necessary to criminalize human trafficking and prosecute its perpetrators.283 The 
Colombian government appeared to be putting its best foot forward, and the United States 
officially certified the efforts with a top-tier ranking from 2001 through 2013.284 
Despite international and domestic policies and programs intended to combat 
human trafficking, Colombia has among the highest instances of human trafficking in the 
Western Hemisphere.285 In 2014, Colombia lost its Tier-1 ranking, meaning the United 
States no longer believed the Colombian government was in full-compliance with anti-
trafficking minimum standards.286 This thesis, moreover, provided evidence signifying 
that Colombia had been generally underperforming the entire time. 
Colombia is not entirely to blame for the persistence of human trafficking. The 
nature of the crime allows it to remain relatively hidden and easy to ignore, and its 
incredibly broad definition muddies the issue of consent and blurs the line between child 
abuse and human trafficking. More significantly, violent conflict has plagued the country 
for decades, reducing state capacity in certain areas to practically nothing. Consequently, 
thwarting human trafficking, protecting and providing for its victims, and prosecuting 
perpetrators of the crime have been extraordinarily challenging. 
Regardless of the difficulties in combating human trafficking, the Colombian 
government has displayed insufficient will to stay in the fight long enough to achieve 
substantial results. Most seemingly-solid programs turned out to be mere smoke and 
mirrors: the government responded publicly to external events and concerns only to 
283 Seelke, Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 15. 
284 Tier placement data compiled from Colombia country profiles in annual TIP reports from 
2001 to 2013 at U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report.” 
285 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report: 2014, 134. 
286 Ibid., 43, 134–35. 
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quietly abandon the projects once the spotlight had passed. As Chapter III revealed, the 
government established laws that it did not enforce, hyped databases it did not populate, 
started and stopped anti-trafficking campaigns as interest waxed and waned, created 
committees that did not produce results, trained personnel who proved uninformed and 
ineffective, publicly worried about human trafficking victims but did little to help the 
individually, and largely failed to convict traffickers unless it would be too obvious if 
they did not. NGOs and IOs did most of the substantive work, but it was still not enough. 
The factors contributing to human trafficking in Colombia overpowered what 
energies the government marshaled against it. Drug trafficking fed the human trafficking 
marketplace, influencing causal factors and disrupting preventative mechanisms. The 
drug conflict limited the state’s reach, compromised its institutions, and established a 
pathway for criminal groups to transition to human trafficking. It also increased human 
displacement and created heavy economic burdens, making people more vulnerable to 
trafficking and less sensitive to the risks involved. Ironically, the harmful effects of drug 
trafficking on human trafficking increased proportional to the amount of effort with 
which governments fought drug trafficking. 
The United States pushed Colombia into the anticommunist and anti-drug 
programs that indirectly exacerbated the human trafficking problem. As part of its Cold 
War with the Soviet Union, the United States encouraged and supported Colombia in 
attacking leftist movements, increasing the violent political divide in the country. Later, 
U.S.-led anti-drug efforts throughout the region pushed cultivation into Colombia, and 
subsequent oppressive policies fragmented the drug trade without reducing the overall 
demand for drugs. Consequently, many new criminal organizations entered the 
enterprise, engrained themselves in sub-national politics, and diversified their portfolio of 
illicit activities. In the end, the United States did not successfully destroy communism or 
drugs in Colombia, but increased violence and enabled human trafficking to prosper. 
Hardline U.S. policies against drugs in Mexico had an incredibly similar effect. 
As Mexico actively fought against organized crime, it experienced the same results as 
Colombia—greatly increased chaos and violence. President Calderon developed a 
punitive strategy that was “catastrophic in terms of deaths resulting from conflicts 
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between traffickers, conflicts between traffickers and the security forces and the deaths of 
innocent people caught in the crossfire, deliberately or by mistake.”287 Similar to the 
Colombian experience, the breakup of a “broad coalition” involved with the illicit drug 
trade led to “an extremely bloody fratricidal war” involving smaller groups and more 
diversified criminal enterprises.288  
Until the late 1980s, a hegemonic coalition of drug traffickers, under the 
leadership of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, operated relatively peaceably in Mexico; 
however, upon Gallardo’s arrest in 1989, the group split then split again, becoming 
violent competitors.289 As was the case in Colombia, firefights “between traffickers and 
police officers and the military grew in direct proportion to the increase in the demand for 
drugs, the expansion of the market, and the arrival of a new generation of traffickers.”290 
In the end, military campaigns against major trafficking groups, such as President 
Vicente Fox’s efforts against the Tijuana and Juárez cartels in 2000, may have displaced 
major groups but only in trade-off for many smaller and more violent trafficking 
organizations.291 Mexico illustrates that the relationship between hardline anti-drug 
policies and a deteriorating domestic situation are not unique to Colombia.  
Understanding that the Colombian case is not an anomaly, policymakers and 
academics in Colombia and the United States must be cognizant of the links between 
drug trafficking, antidrug efforts, and human trafficking. In the past, such links were 
either unknown or ignored, and well-intentioned policy compounded Colombia’s 
problems, rather than solved them. Going forward, more research is needed into the 
nature of human trafficking in Colombia, focusing on how to protect the individuals at 
greatest risk and deter those most likely to exploit them. At a bare minimum, the 
governments involved should reevaluate an ongoing strategy that continues to make 
things worse. 
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